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WRONGFUL LIFE AND WRONGFUL
BIRTH: MEDICAL MALPRACTICE IN
GENETIC COUNSELING AND
PRENATAL TESTING
THOMAS DEWrrT ROGERS, III*
I. INTRODUCTION
In the fifteen years following the seminal case of Gleitman
v. Cosgrove," numerous courts have considered the perplexing
problems raised by claims predicated on "wrongful life"2 or
"wrongful birth."3 The theoretical bases of these actions are
closely related, and they reflect the respective medical malprac-
tice claims of a congenitally deformed child and his parents
against a physician or other medical personnel for failure accu-
rately to advise, counsel, and test the mother concerning the
particular fetal risks at issue.
The judicial reaction to these two causes of action, however,
has been remarkably disparate. Indeed, in the flurry of judicial
* Member, South Carolina Bar. B.A. 1975, University of Virginia; J.D. 1980, Univer-
sity of South Carolina.
1. 49 N.J. 22, 227 A.2d 689 (1967)(overruled in part by Berman v. Allan, 80 N.J. 421,
404 A.2d 8 (1979)).
2. In a "wrongful life" claim,
[t]he child does not allege that the physician's negligence caused the child's
deformity. Rather, the claim is that the physician's negligence-his failure to
adequately inform the parents of the risk-has caused the birth of the de-
formed child. The child argues that but for the inadequate advice, it would not
have been born to experience the pain and suffering attributable to the
deformity.
Comment, 54 TuL. L. Rv. 480, 485 (1980)(emphasis in original). See, e.g., Phillips v.
United States (Phillips 1), 508 F. Supp. 537 (D.S.C. 1980); Curlender v. Bio-Science Lab-
oratories, 106 Cal. App. 3d 811, 165 Cal. Rptr. 477 (1980). See notes 15-23 and accompa-
nying text infra.
3. A "wrongful birth" claim is an action brought by the parents against "a physician
[who] failed to inform... [them] of the increased possibility that the mother would give
birth to a child suffering from birth defects... [, thereby precluding] an informed deci-
sion about whether to have the child." Comment, 8 HopsmA L. Rav. 257, 257-58 (1979).
See, e.g., Phillips v. United States (Phillips I/), 508 F. Supp. 544 (D.S.C. 1981); Jacobs v.
Theimer, 519 S.W.2d 846 (Tex. 1975). See notes 193-205 and accompanying text infra.
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activity since 1975,' two distinct and ostensibly inconsistent
trends can readily be discerned: first, with the exception of the
intermediate appellate courts in two jurisdictions, the courts
have invariably refused to recognize wrongful life claims;6 and
second, while some of the earlier wrongful birth cases denied re-
covery J the jurisdictions that have reached the merits of this
question are presently unanimous in their recognition of wrong-
ful birth claims.8 This divergence of judicial response is most
frequently ascribed to fundamental conceptual differences be-
tween the two causes of action, particularly in the area of dam-
ages," but other possible explanations include theological or phil-
osophical disapproval of abortion,10 the inherent "cultural lag"
between technological advancements and popular morality,""
and the current unavailability of in utero treatment techniques,
short of eugenic abortion, 12 for certain congenital defects.' 3 This
4. See notes 23 & 204 infra.
5. Curlender, 106 Cal. App. 3d 811, 165 Cal. Rptr. 477; Becker v. Schwartz, 60
A.D.2d 587, 400 N.Y.S.2d 119 (1977), modified, 46 N.Y.2d 401, 386 N.E.2d 807, 413
N.Y.S.2d 895 (1978); Park v. Chessin, 60 A.D.2d 80, 400 N.Y.S.2d 110 (1977), modified
sub nom. Becker v. Schwartz, 46 N.Y.2d 401, 386 N.E.2d 807, 413 N.Y.S.2d 895 (1978).
6. E~g., Berman v. Allan, 80 N.J. 421, 404 A.2d 8 (1979); Becker, 46 N.Y.2d 401, 386
N.E.2d 807, 413 N.Y.S.2d 895. See notes 117 & 118 and accompanying text infra.
7. E.g., Gleitman, 49 N.J. 22, 227 A.2d 689; Johnson v. Yeshiva Univ., 53 A.D.2d
523, 384 N.Y.S.2d 455, af'd, 42 N.Y.2d 818, 364 N.E.2d 1340, 396 N.Y.S.2d 647 (1977);
Stewart v. Long Island College Hosp., 58 Misc. 2d 432, 296 N.Y.S.2d 41 (Sup. Ct. 1968),
modified, 35 A.D.2d 531, 313 N.Y.S.2d 502 (1970), aff'd mem., 30 N.Y.2d 695, 283 N.E.2d
616, 332 N.Y.S.2d 640 (1972).
8. E.g., Berman, 80 N.J. 421, 404 A.2d 8; Becker, 46 N.Y.2d 401, 386 N.E.2d 807, 413
N.Y.S.2d 895. See note 271 and accompanying text infra.
9. See, e.g., Gleitman, 49 N.J. at 29, 227 A.2d at 692; Becker, 46 N.Y.2d at 412, 386
N.E.2d at 812, 413 N.Y.S.2d at 900. As stated by the court in Gleitman, "[b]y asserting
that he should not have been born, the infant plaintiff makes it logically impossible for a
court to measure his alleged damages because of the impossibility of making the compar-
ison required by compensatory remedies." 49 N.J. at 29, 227 A.2d at 692.
10. See notes 302-321 and accompanying text infra.
11. Peters & Peters, Wrongful Life: Recognizing the Defective Child's Right to a
Cause of Action, 18 DuQ. L. Rlv. 857, 871-76 (1980). See Phillips I, 508 F. Supp. at 543.
12. "An abortion undertaken to prevent the birth of a genetically defective child is
term[ed] 'eugenic' while one to prevent harm to the mother-to-be is termed 'therapeu-
tic."' Curlender, 106 Cal. App. 3d at 816 n.6, 165 Cal. Rptr. at 480 n.6 (citing Speck v.
Finegold, 268 Pa. Super. Ct. 342, 348 n.4, 408 A.2d 496, 499 n.4 (1979)).
13. See Phillips I, 508 F. Supp. at 543 n.12; Smith v. United States, 392 F. Supp.
654, 655 (N.D. Ohio 1975). Indeed, the unavailability of in utero treatment techniques
for the congenital defects most frequently associated with wrongful life claims may con-
stitute the most significant distinction between such claims and other prenatal torts.
Phillips 1, 508 F. Supp. at 543 n.12. See notes 320 & 321 and accompanying text infra.
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article examines the historical development and theoretical un-
derpinnings of wrongful life and wrongful birth claims in an ef-
fort to clarify the complex issues that the courts have addressed
and the troublesome questions they have failed to confront.
II. WRONGFUL LIFE
A. Background
At the outset, "[a] clear delineation of certain terminologi-
cal distinctions is essential to a proper understanding of the the-
oretical issues raised by [birth-related claims] . . .[and] to the
development of a functional analytic framework. ' 14 Unfortu-
nately, the difficulties presented by this categorization process
have been compounded by haphazard use of the available termi-
nology, both in the cases and the commentary, that fails ade-
quately to distinguish factually and legally dissimilar claims. A
wrongful life claim, which is brought by or on behalf of an infant
who suffers from a genetic or other congenital' 5 defect, alleges
that the physician, in negligently failing accurately to advise,
counsel, and test the plaintiff's parents concerning genetic or
teratogenic risks to potential offspring suggested by maternal
age, family history, or other circumstances, has breached the ap-
plicable standard of medical care and precluded an informed pa-
rental decision to avoid the plaintiff's conception or birth. Most
wrongful life claims are premised on postconception negligence
by the physician; for example, in Down's syndrome cases,'6 the
infant-plaintiff generally alleges that subsequent to the diagnosis
14. Phillij's II, 508 F. Supp. at 545 n.1.
15. A congenital defect is one "[e]xisting at, and usually before, birth ... " DoR-
LAND'S ILLUSTRATED MEDICAL DICTIONARY 298 (26th ed. 1981); the term refers generally
"to conditions that are present at birth, regardless of their causation." Id. Many of these
defects are hereditary, meaning that they are genetically transmitted or have a genetic
etiology, see generally W. FUHRMANN & F. VOGEL, GENETIC COUNSELING (2d ed. 1976),
such as Down's syndrome (mongolism) and Tay-Sachs disease. See notes 77 & 102 infra.
Some congenital defects are not hereditary, however, but are instead caused by the expo-
sure of a healthy fetus to certain environmental factors, such as maternal dietary defi-
ciencies, radiation, maternal infections, and chemical agents. W. HAMLTON & H. Moss-
MAN, HUMAN EMBRYOLOGY 206 (4th ed. 1972); J. LANGMAN, MEDICAL EMBRYOLOGY 109-10
(4th ed. 1981). The most common congenital defect of this type, at least in the context of
birth-related claims, is rubella syndrome or congenital rubella, a group of fetal impair-
ments caused by the infection of a pregnant woman with rubella (German measles). See
note 39 infra.
16. See note 77 infra.
1982] 715
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of pregnancy, the physician failed to advise the prospective par-
ents of the increased possibility that their child would be af-
flicted with the genetic defect because of advanced maternal
age 17 or family history"5 and failed to inform them of the testing
procedures"9 available to determine whether the fetus was so af-
flicted. Some wrongful life claims have, however, been based at
least partially on a physician's negligent failure accurately to
perform genetic screening tests on potential parents" or cor-
rectly to inform them of the hereditary nature of disorders evi-
dent in previous children.21 Nevertheless, whether predicated on
preconception or postconception medical malpractice, wrongful
life claims can be distinguished from other birth-related actions
by their fundamental premise: but for the physician's negligent
failure to advise the plaintiff's parents concerning foreseeable fe-
tal risks and available testing procedures or failure accurately to
administer those tests, the parents would have reached an in-
formed decision to avoid the conception or birth of the plaintiff,
and the lifetime of suffering inflicted on him by his condition
would have been prevented.
As expressed by one court, the essential postulate of any
wrongful life claim is the "right of a child to be born as a whole,
functional human being. '22 Presently, sixteen cases23 in eight ju-
17. E.g., Berman v. Allan, 80 N.J. 421, 425, 404 A.2d 8, 10 (1979). Medical studies
have indicated that "about 60% of all mongoloid babies are born to mothers above 35
years of age." NATIONAL ACADEMY OF SCIENCES, GENETIC SCREENING 134 (1975). See note
78 infra.
18. E.g., Phillips I, 508 F. Supp. 537 (D.S.C. 1980)(mother's sister afflicted with
Down's syndrome); Karlsons v. Guerinot, 57 A.D.2d 73, 394 N.Y.S.2d 933 (1977) (mother
had previously given birth to child afflicted with Down's syndrome).
19. The most important postconception genetic testing procedure is amniocentesis,
which "consists of puncturing the anesthetized abdominal wall with a needle and with-
drawing... a small amount of the amniotic fluid from the amniotic sac. The [fetal] cells
in the fluid are used immediately for diagnosis or are cultivated for later diagnosis." C.
STERN, PRINCIPLES OF HUMAN GENETICS 808-09 (3d ed. 1973). See notes 44-47 and accom-
panying text infra.
20. See Curlender 106 Cal. App. 3d 811, __, 165 Cal. Rptr. 477, 480 (Ct. App.
1980)(possible negligent performance of screening test for Tay-Sachs disease).
21. Park, 60 A.D.2d 80, 81, 400 N.Y.S.2d 110, 111 (1977), modified sub nom. Becker
v. Schwartz, 46 N.Y.2d 401, 386 N.E.2d 807, 413 N.Y.S.2d 895 (1978)(parents mis-
informed that chances of having a second child afflicted with infantile polycystic kidney
disease were "'practically nil' inasmuch as the disease was not hereditary"). See Schroe-
der v. Perkel, 87 N.J. 53, 432 A.2d 834 (1981) (failure to diagnose cystic fibrosis in previ-
ous child).
22. Park, 60 A.D.2d at 88, 400 N.Y.S.2d at 114. This premise has also been de-
[Vol. 33
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risdictions have addressed claims within this definition of
wrongful life.
Much of the confusion concerning the precise meaning of
wrongful life results from the New Jersey Supreme Court's ap-
propriation of that term, in Gleitman v. Cosgrove,2 from an ear-
lier line of cases that used it to describe an action brought by a
healthy child alleging illegitimacy as his sole injury.25 "Wrongful
life" was first employed to describe this type of action in Zapeda
v. Zapeda,26 in which the plaintiff sued his biological father for
scribed as the right to be born healthy, Comment, 27 BuFFALo L. REV. 537, 537 (1978),
and more broadly, as the right not to be born. Gleitman, 49 N.J. at 63, 227 A.2d at 711.
See Elliott v. Brown, 361 So. 2d 546, 548 (Ala. 1978). Cf. Smith v. Brennan, 31 N.J. 353,
364, 157 A.2d 497, 503 (1960)(in the context of a prenatal tort case, the court stated that
a "child has the right to begin life with a sound mind and body").
23. Phillips I, 508 F. Supp. 537 (D.S.C. 1980); Gildiner v. Thomas Jefferson Univ.
Hosp., 451 F. Supp. 692 (E.D. Pa. 1978); Smith v. United States, 392 F. Supp. 654 (N.D.
Ohio 1975)(applying Texas law); Turpin v. Sortini, 119 Cal. App. 3d 690, 174 Cal. Rptr.
128 (1981); Curlender, 106 Cal. App. 3d 811, 165 Cal. Rptr. 477 (1980); Schroeder v.
Perkel, 87 N.J. 53, 432 A.2d 834 (1981); Berman, 80 N.J. 421, 404 A.2d 8 (1979);
Gleitman, 49 N.J. 22, 227 A.2d 689 (1967)(overruled in part by Berman); Becker, 60
A.D.2d 587, 400 N.Y.S.2d 119 (1977), modified, 46 N.Y.2d 401, 386 N.E.2d 807, 413
N.Y.S.2d 895 (1978); Park, 60 A.D.2d 80, 400 N.Y.S.2d 110 (1977), modified sub noma.
Becker, 46 N.Y.2d 401, 386 N.E.2d 807, 413 N.Y.S.2d 895; Johnson, 53 A.D.2d 523, 384
N.Y.S.2d 455 (1976), af'd, 42 N.Y.2d 818, 364 N.E.2d 1340, 396 N.Y.S.2d 647 (1977);
Karlsons v. Guerinot, 57 A.D.2d 73, 394 N.Y.S.2d 933 (1977); Greenberg v. Kliot, 47
A.D.2d 765, 367 N.Y.S.2d 966 (1975)(mem.) leave to appeal denied, 37 N.Y.2d 707, 375
N.Y.S.2d 1026 (1975)(facts summarized in Park, 60 A.D.2d at 93, 400 N.Y.S.2d at 116-18
(Titone, J., dissenting)); Stewart, 58 Misc. 2d 432, 296 N.Y.S.2d 41 (Sup. Ct. 1968), mod-
ified, 35 A.D.2d 531, 313 N.Y.S.2d 502 (1970), af'd mem., 30 N.Y.2d 695, 283 N.E.2d
616, 332 N.Y.S.2d 640 (1972); Dumer v. St. Michael's Hosp., 69 Wis. 2d 766, 233 N.W.2d
372 (1975). See Anderson v. Wagner, 61 IM. App. 3d 822, 378 N.E.2d 805 (1978)(action
barred by statute of limitation); Jacobs, 519 S.W.2d at 849 (dicta).
24. 49 N.J. 22, 227 A.2d 689 (1967).
25. See Tedeschi, On Tort Liability for "Wrongful Life," 1 IsRAEL L. REv. 513
(1966), reprinted in 7 J. FAM. L. 465 (1967). "Wrongful life" was first employed to de-
scribe this type of action in Zapeda v. Zapeda, in which the plaintiff sued his biological
father for inducing his mother to engage in sexual relations based on a false promise of
marriage and asserted that various damages flowed from the stigma of bastardy imposed
on the plaintiff by these circumstances. 41 IM. App. 2d 240, 245-46, 259, 190 N.E.2d 849,
851, 858 (1963), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 945 (1964). Claims of this type have typically been
brought against the father. Pinkney v. Pinkney, 198 So. 2d 52 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1967);
Slawek v. Stroh, 62 Wis. 2d 295, 215 N.W.2d 9 (1974)(counterclaim). They have, how-
ever, also been premised on the conduct of third parties. E.g., Williams v. State, 46 Misc.
2d 824, 260 N.Y.S.2d 953 (Ct. Cl. 1965), reu'd, 25 A.D.2d 907, 269 N.Y.S.2d 786 (1966),
aff'd, 18 N.Y.2d 481, 223 N.E.2d 343, 276 N.Y.S.2d 885 (1966)(claim predicated on al-
leged negligence of state employees in failing to prevent the rape of plaintiff's institu-
tionalized mother).
26. 41 ill. App. 2d 240, 259, 190 N.E.2d 849, 858 (1963), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 945
5
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inducing his mother to engage in sexual relations based on a
false promise of marriage.27 The plaintiff asserted that various
damages flowed from the stigma of bastardy imposed upon him
by these circumstances. Claims of this type have typically been
brought against the father, 8 but they have also been premised
on the conduct of third parties."' Despite frequent use of the
term "wrongful life" to describe these claims,30 they do not fall
within the present definition of that terms' and "are now most
commonly referred to as 'dissatisfied life' cases .... ,,2 Although
dissatisfied life claims are distinguishable from wrongful life
claims "with respect to the duties and injuries at issue,"3' the
actions exhibit certain similarities with respect to calculation of
damages.34 To at least some extent, a comparison of "impaired
life" with nonexistence is therefore necessary.
Another category of cases frequently, though imprecisely,
denominated wrongful life actions can perhaps best be described
as a filial claim that corresponds to the parental cause of action
for "wrongful pregnancy." 5 If the negligent performance of a
sterilization or contraceptive procedure results in the birth of an
unplanned child, the parents' cause of action is one for wrongful
(1964).
27. Id. at 245-46, 190 N.E.2d at 851.
28. Pinkney v. Pinkney, 198 So. 2d 52 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1967); Slawek v. Stroh, 62
Wis. 2d 295, 215 N.W.2d 9 (1974)(counterclaim).
29. Williams v. State, 48 Misc. 2d 824, 260 N.Y.S.2d 953 (Ct. Cl. 1965), rev'd, 25
A.D.2d 907, 296 N.Y.S.2d 786 (1966), afl'd, 18 N.Y.2d 481, 223 N.E.2d 843, 276 N.Y.S.2d
885 (1966)(claim predicated on alleged negligence of state employees in failing to prevent
the rape of plaintiff's institutionalized mother).
30. E.g., Zapeda, 41 Ill. App. 2d at 259, 190 N.E.2d at 858; Tedeschi, supra note 25,
at 514 & nn.2-3, reprinted in 7 J. FAM. L. at 466 & nn. 2-3.
31. See note 2 supra.
32. Comment, 54 TUL. L. REV. 480, 486 (1980). See Phillips II, 508 F. Supp. at 540
n.7; Cohen, Park v. Chessin: The Continuing Judicial Development of the Theory of
"Wrongful Life," 4 AM. J.L. & MED. 211, 212 (1979); Comment, 13 WAKE FORREST L.
REV. 712, 716 n.27 (1977). But see Kashi, The Case of the Unwanted Blessing: Wrongful
Life, 31 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1409, 1409 (1977)("emotional trauma resulting from the stigma
of bastardy"cases); Comment, 40 Mo. L. RV. 167, 177 (1979) ("bastard cases").
33. Phillips II, 508 F. Supp. at 541 n.7. A wrongful life claim is brought by a defec-
tive child and is based on medical malpractice in failing to advise potential or prospec-
tive parents of pertinent fetal risks that may produce severe and irreversible birth de-
fects; by contrast, a dissatisfied life claim is brought by a healthy child and is based more
generally on negligence or fraud in failing to avoid plaintiff's illegitimate birth.
34. See Gleitman, 49 N.J. at 29, 277 A.2d at 692.
35. See notes 212-218 and accompanying text infra. For an analysis of the "wrongful
pregnancy" cause of action, see Holt, Wrongful Pregnancy, 33 S.C.L. REv. 759 (1982).
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pregnancy; the child's corresponding cause of action is often
mischaracterized as one for wrongful life.3 6 Claims of this type
have generally been brought by healthy children, both legiti-
mate37 and illegitimate, 8 but have also been brought by unplan-
ned children who, coincidentally, were born with congenital de-
fects.39 Although these claims exhibit some similarities to
wrongful life claims, particularly when the child is defective and
the motivating factor in the parents' decision to undergo the
sterilization procedure was a desire to avoid known genetic risks
to possible offspring,40 the two types of actions are nonetheless
distinguishable.
In a true wrongful life claim, the gravamen of the complaint
is that the physician's failure accurately to counsel and test the
plaintiff's parents concerning certain fetal risks suggested by
maternal age and physical condition, family history, or other cir-
cumstances precluded a parental decision to spare the plaintiff
from the particular affliction by avoiding conception or by abort-
ing the fetus. In comparison, the gravamen of the complaint in
the filial claim corresponding to wrongful pregnancy is that the
physician's negligence in performing the contraceptive procedure
proximately caused the birth of an unplanned child; the conse-
quences of that unplanned birth bear solely on the issue of dam-
ages. Because the sine qua non of the latter type of claim is the
unplanned, as opposed to uninformed, nature of the plaintiff's
birth,4 1 these claims are more appropriately referred to as "un-
planned life" actions. Thus, in a situation involving medical
malpractice in performing a contraceptive procedure, the paren-
tal cause of action is one for wrongful pregnancy and the filial
36. See, e.g., Trotzig, The Defective Child and the Actions for Wrongful Life and
Wrongful Birth, 14 FAM. L.Q. 15, 16 n.3 (1980).
37. E.g., Clegg v. Chase, 89 Misc. 2d 510, 391 N.Y.S.2d 966 (Sup. Ct. 1977)(healthy
child born following failed tubal ligation).
38. E.g., Stills v. Gratton, 55 Cal. App. 3d 698, 127 Cal. Rptr. 652 (1976) (healthy but
illegitimate child born following unsuccessful abortion).
39. LaPoint v. Shirley, 409 F. Supp. 118 (W.D. Tex. 1976)(child born with umbilical
hernia following failed tubal ligation); Elliott v. Brown, 361 So. 2d 546 (Ala. 1978)(child
born with "serious deformities" following failed vasectomy); Speck v. Finegold, 268 Pa.
Super. Ct. 342, 408 A.2d 496 (1979)(child born with neurofibromatosis following failed
vasectomy and unsuccessful abortion).
40. Compare Speck, 268 Pa. Super. Ct. 342, 408 A.2d 496 with Curlender, 106 Cal.
App. 3d 811, 165 Cal. Rptr. 477.




Rogers: Wrongful Life and Wrongful Birth: Medical Malpractice in Genetic
Published by Scholar Commons, 1982
SOUTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
cause of action is one for unplanned life; in a situation involving
medical malpractice in genetic counseling or prenatal testing,
the parental cause of action is one for wrongful birth and the
filial cause of action is one for wrongful life.
B. Historical Perspective
The genesis and development of wrongful life claims, as well
as birth-related claims in general, have been concomitant with
"[t]he growth of medical knowledge regarding birth defects
* ,,42 More specifically, "[t]he development of ... sophisti-
cated biochemical and cytogenic tests for assaying amniotic fluid
and maternal and fetal blood... significantly enhanced the im-
portance of the reproductive counseling aspect of medical genet-
ics."' 4 3 Indeed, the profusion of wrongful life claims since 1975
largely coincides with the refinement of amniocentesis, which al-
lows a physician to remove, culture, and test fetal cells that have
been sloughed into the fluid surrounding the fetus in the amni-
otic sac." In this respect, the crucial step in the clinical develop-
ment of amniocentesis was its gradual transition during the
early 1970s from an experimental procedure to one commonly
accepted in medical practice.45 By the mid-1970s, prenatal diag-
nosis through amniocentesis and related procedures "during the
midtrimester of pregnancy [had] become an accepted practice
for the detection and prevention [through abortion] of certain
severe congenital abnormalities and hereditary diseases. "46 The
42. Cohen, supra note 32, at 212.
43. Capron, Tort Liability in Genetic Counseling, 79 COLUM. L. REv. 618, 626
(1979).
44. W. FUHRMANN & F. VOGEL, supra note 15, at 91-94; C. STERN, supra note 19, at
808-09; Friedman, Legal Implications of Amniocentesis, 123 U. PA. L. REV. 92, 97-99
(1974); Shaw, Genetically Defective Children: Emerging Legal Considerations, 3 AM.
J.L. & MED. 333, 335 (1977); Note, 87 YALE L.J. 1488, 1493 n.21 (1978).
45. Chapman, What are Your Odds in the Prenatal Gamble, in LEGAL ASPECTS OF
MED. PRAc. 31, 32 (1979). See Nadler & Gerbie, Present Status of Amniocentesis in
Uterine Diagnosis of Genetic Defects, 38 OBST. & GYN. 789 (1971). "Available legal pre-
cedent indicates that most courts would determine that amniocentesis is no longer exper-
imental." Milunsky & Reilly, The "New" Genetics: Emerging Medicolegal Issues in the
Prenatal Diagnosis of Hereditary Disorders, 1 AM. J.L. & MED. 71, 76 (1975). Compare
Johnson, 42 N.Y.2d at 820, 364 N.E.2d at 1341, 396 N.Y.S.2d at 648 (status of amni-
ocentesis in 1969) with Berman, 80 N.J. at 424, 404 A.2d at 10 (status of amniocentesis
in mid-1970s).
46. Saul, et al., Amniocentesis and Prenatal Diagnosis in South Carolina: A Col-
laborative Report for the Years 1976 to 1979, 76 J.S.C. MED. A. 387, 387 (1980). "Recent
[Vol. 33
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refinement of amniocentesis, along with other prenatal testing
procedures, 47 established the technological predicate for wrong-
ful life and wrongful birth claims.
In 1967, the New Jersey Supreme Court, in Gleitman v.
Cosgrove 4  became the first appellate court to consider a wrong-
ful life claim. The plaintiff in Gleitman had been born with se-
vere birth defects as a result of his mother's exposure to rubella
during her pregnancy,49 and he alleged that the defendant physi-
cians had precluded the opportunity for abortion by erroneously
informing his parents that the viral infection would have no ef-
fect on him.50 Rejecting the child's cause of action, the court ad-
vanced certain arguments that have appeared frequently in later
cases. First, the court held that the plaintiff did not suffer dam-
ages "cognizable at law."51 Drawing heavily on the reasoning de-
veloped in earlier dissatisfied life cases,52 the court pointed to
both the practical difficulty in measuring damages53 and the
"logical impossibility" of comparing life with nonexistence.
54
studies indicate that amniocentesis is highly accurate in predicting the presence of chro-
mosomal defects, and that the risk bf even minor damage to mother or fetus deriving
from the procedure is less than one percent." Berman, 80 N.J. at 424, 404 A.2d at 10.
The safety and accuracy of the procedure, as indicated in Berman, are well documented.
E.g., Chapman, supra note 45, at 34; Feinman, Getting Along with the Genetic Genie, in
LEGAL ASPECTS OF MED. PRAC. 38, 41 (1979); Saul, et. al., supra, at 387; National Regis-
try for Amniocentesis Study Group, Midtrimester Amniocentesis for Prenatal Diagno-
sis: Safety and Accuracy, 236 J.A.M.A. 1471 (1976).
47. For a discussion of other prenatal testing procedures, see Goodner, Prenatal Ge-
netic Diagnosis: Present and Future, 19 CLIN. OBST. & GYN. 965, 965-76 (1976); Hirsh-
horn, Prenatal Diagnosis of Genetic Disease, in DEVELOPMENTAL GENETICs 87, 93 (C.
Fenoglio, R. Goodman & D. King eds. 1976); Kass & Shaw, The Risk of Birth Defects:
Jacobs v. Theimer and Parents' Right to Know, 2 AM. J.L. & MED. 213, 222 (1977); Saul,
et al., supra note 46, at 388-89; Note, 87 YALE L.J. 1488, 1493 nn.21 & 22 (1978).
48. Gleitman v. Cosgrove, 49 N.J. 22, 227 A.2d 689 (1967).
49. For a discussion of the congenital defects associated with the exposure of a fetus
to rubella, see S. CRESS, S. KORN, & P. FERNANDEZ, PSYCHIATRIC DISORDERS OF CHILDREN
WITH CONGENITAL RUBELLA 16-18, 145-54 (1971); C. STERN, supra note 19, at 421.
50. 49 N.J. at 24, 26, 227 A.2d at 691.
51. Id. at 29, 227 A.2d at 692.
52. Id. (citing Zepeda, 41 IMI. App.2d 240, 190 N.E.2d 849; Williams, 18 N.Y.2d 481,
223 N.E.2d 343, 276 N.Y.S.2d 885; Tedeschi, supra note 25).
53. 49 N.J. at 28, 227 A.2d at 692.
54. The normal measure of damages in tort actions is compensatory. Damages
are measured by comparing the condition plaintiff would have been in, had the
defendants not been negligent, with plaintiff's impaired condition as a result of
the negligence. The infant plaintiff would have us measure the difference be-
tween his life with defects against the utter void of nonexistence, but it is im-
possible to make such a determination. This Court cannot weigh the value of
1982]
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Second, the court asserted that, even if the damages were cogni-
zable, public policy concerning the sanctity of human life mili-
tated against the child's claim. One component of this argument
was the statutory proscription of abortion;55 a second facet was a
more generalized expression of the "countervailing public policy
supporting the preciousness of human life. '" The court was
reluctant to assume that nonexistence could ever be preferable
to life, even severely burdened life, and suggested that if the
plaintiff "could have been asked.., whether his life should be
snuffed out before his full term of gestation could run its course,
our felt intuition of human nature tells us he would almost
surely choose life with defects as against no life at all. ''57
One year later, in Stewart v. Long Island College Hospi-
tal,58 the New York Supreme Court employed the two rationales
advanced in Gleitman to dismiss a wrongful life claim involving
congenital rubella. The Appellate Division, affirming the dismis-
sal, emphasized the abortion issue and suggested that the diffi-
cult questions presented by wrongful life claims should be left to
the legislature. 9
In addition to the gradual acceptance during the early 1970s
of prenatal testing procedures such as amniocentesis and related
life with impairments against the nonexistence of life itself. By asserting that
he should not have been born, the infant plaintiff makes it logically impossible
for a court to measure his alleged damages because of the impossibility of mak-
ing the comparison required by compensatory remedies.
Id. at 29, 277 A.2d at 692.
55. See id. at 31, 40-48, 227 A.2d at 693, 699-703 (Francis, J., concurring). See also
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:87-1 (West 1969)(repealed 1979). Although the court discussed this
issue primarily in conjunction with the parent's wrongful birth claim, "[t]he anti-abor-
tion attitude... may have pervaded the court's wrongful life thinking as well." Com-
ment, 8 HOFSTRA L. REv. 257, 267 n.85 (1979).
56. 49 N.J. at 31, 227 A.2d at 693. The policy considerations perceived by the dis-
sent differed significantly from those of the majority, suggesting that the denial of the
wrongful life claim "permits a wrong with serious consequential injury to go wholly un-
redressed. That provides no deterrent to professional irresponsibility and is neither just
nor compatible with expanding principles of liability in the field of torts." Id. at 49, 227
A.2d at 703 (Jacobs, J., dissenting).
57. Id. at 30, 227 A.2d at 693.
58. 58 Misc. 2d 432, 296 N.Y.S.2d 41 (Sup. Ct. 1968), modified, 35 A.D.2d 531, 313
N.Y.S.2d 502 (1970), aff'd mem., 30 N.Y.2d 695, 283 N.E.2d 616, 332 N.Y.S.2d 640
(1972).
59. 35 A.D.2d at 532, 313 N.Y.S.2d at 503. Prior to Park and Becker, see notes 66-70
and accompanying text infra, Stewart was viewed by the New York courts as dispositive
on the issue of wrongful life. Johnson, 53 A.D.2d 523, 384 N.Y.S.2d 455; Karlsons, 57
A.D.2d 73, 394 N.Y.S.2d 933; Greenberg, 47 A.D.2d 765, 367 N.Y.S.2d 966.
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tests,"° the landmark United States Supreme Court decisions in
Roe v. Wades1 and Doe v. Bolton 2 placed abortion decisions
during the first trimester of pregnancy within the constitutional
right of privacy derived from the fifth and fourteenth amend-
ments.6 3 The first appellate decisions recognizing parental claims
for wrongful birth were also rendered during this period.6 Al-
though the confluence of these developments altered the reason-
ing of subsequent wrongful life decisions to some extent, the ul-
timate conclusion that the claims were not cognizable remained
the same. 5
Intermediate appellate opinions in Park v. Chessin" and
Becker v. Schwartz,67 both decided in 1977, represent the first
judicial recognition of wrongful life claims. In Park, a plaintiff
afflicted with infantile polycystic kidney disease' s sued the de-
fendant obstetricians for negligently misinforming her parents
that the birth defect was not hereditary after a previous child
60. See notes 42-47 and accompanying text supra.
61. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
62. 410 U.S. 179 (1973).
63. Although Roe and Doe were undeniably significant in this respect, it can be ar-
gued that eugenic abortions represent a legitimate exercise of the parents' constitution-
ally protected right of privacy concerning conception, procreation, and other familial de-
cisions and fall within earlier case law concerning such decisions. Phillips II, 508 F.
Supp. at 550 (citing Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965)).
64. Jacobs, 519 S.W.2d 846; Dumer, 69 Wis. 2d 766, 233 N.W.2d 372. See Cohen,
supra note 32, at 214.
65. For example, in Dumer, the Wisconsin Supreme Court recognized the parental
claim for wrongful birth in a congenital rubella case while holding that the filial claim for
wrongful life did "not state a cause of action against the defendants." 69 Wis. 2d at 773,
233 N.W.2d at 376. De-emphasizing the abortion issue, id. at 775 n.6, 223 N.W.2d at 377
n.6, the court relied on Gleitman to support the observation that "[t]he major obstacle
to the claim of the infant-plaintiff is a determination of damages." Id. at 772, 223
N.W.2d at 375. The dichotomous approach exhibited in Dumer, recognizing wrongful
birth claims while denying wrongful life claims, was echoed in numerous cases in the
latter half of the decade. E.g., Gildiner, 451 F. Supp. 692.
66. 60 A.D.2d 80, 400 N.Y.S.2d 110 (1977), modified sub nom. Becker v. Schwartz,
46 N.Y.2d 401, 386 N.E.2d 807, 413 N.Y.S.2d 895 (1978).
67. 60 A.D.2d 587, 400 N.Y.S.2d 119 (1977), modified, 46 N.Y.2d 401, 386 N.E.2d
807, 413 N.Y.S.2d 895 (1978).
68. Polycystic kidney disease is a congenital kidney disorder that is "uniformly fatal
in infancy." Perkoff, Renal Diseases in 1 GENETIC DIsORDERS OF MAN 433 (R. Goodman
ed. 1970). The infant plaintiff in Park died when she was two and one-half years of age.
60 A.D.2d at 81, 400 N.Y.S.2d at 111. For a description of this disease, see STEDMAN'S
MEDICAL DICTIONARY 745 (4th unabr. Lawyer's ed. 1976). See V. McKusicK, MENDELIAN
INHERITANCE IN MAN 267-68 (3d ed. 1971).
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was similarly afflicted69 and asserted that her parents were
thereby precluded from making an informed decision to avoid
her birth.70 The trial court had denied the defendants' motion to
dismiss the wrongful life claim, observing somewhat obliquely
that "[t]he infant defendant does not seek damages for being
born, per se, but rather seeks damages for the pain suffered by
her after her birth based on the tort committed prior to concep-
tion."71 The Appellate Division of the Supreme Court also con-
cluded that the claim was judicially cognizable 2.7 The court con-
ceded that the decision was unprecedented, 3 yet offered scant
support for it beyond the statement that
cases are not decided in a vacuum; rather decisional law must
keep pace with expanding technological, economic and social
change. Inherent in the abolition of the statutory ban on abor-
tion.., is a public policy consideration which gives potential
parents the right, within certain statutory and case law limita-
tions, not to have a child. This right extends to instances in
which it can be determined with reasonable medical certainty
that the child would be born deformed. The breach of this
right may also be said to be tortious to the fundamental right
of a child to be born as a whole, functional human being.74
The policy considerations advanced in Gleitman were noticeably
absent from the majority opinion and appeared only in the
dissent. 5
In Becker v. Schwartz, 76 a plaintiff afflicted with Down's
syndrome7 7 alleged that the defendant obstetricians prevented
69. 60 A.D.2d at 83, 400 N.Y.S.2d at 111.
70. Id.
71. 88 Misc. 2d 222, 229, 387 N.Y.S.2d 204, 209 (Sup. Ct. 1976) (emphasis in origi-
nal). On appeal, the trial court's approach to the problem, construing the claim as one
for pain and suffering after birth and not "wrongful life," was reiterated in a concurring
opinion. 60 A.D.2d at 88, 400 N.Y.S.2d at 115 (Cohalan, J., concurring).
72. 60 A.D.2d at 88, 400 N.Y.S.2d at 114.
73. Id. at 87-88, 400 N.Y.S.2d at 114.
74. Id. at 88, 400 N.Y.S.2d at 114.
75. Id. at 90-91, 400 N.Y.S.2d at 116 (Titone, J., dissenting). The dissent also ad-
vanced other policy considerations, including the possibility of adverse effects on in-
trafamily relationships and the opportunity for fraudulent claims. Id. at 92-94, 400
N.Y.S.2d at 117-18.
76. 60 A.D.2d 587, 400 N.Y.S.2d 119.
77. Down's syndrome is also known as mongolism or 21-trisomy. C. STERN, supra
note 19, at 111, 115. For a description of the abnormalities caused by Down's syndrome,
see STEDMAN'S MEDICAL DICTIONARY, supra note 68, at 1382. See generally C. BENDA,
724 [Vol. 33
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an informed parental decision to terminate the pregnancy by
negligently failing to inform her parents of the increased inci-
dence of the genetic defect in children born to women over
thirty-five years of age 8 or of the availability of amniocentesis
and related fetal testing procedures to detect the existence of
the condition. A New York trial court dismissed the wrongful
life claim for failure to state a cause of action 79 but the Appel-
late Division of the Supreme Court, relying primarily on Park v.
Chessin,0 reversed and held that the complaint stated a valid
cause of action for the child's pain and suffering. As in Park,
however, the court did not directly address the theoretical diffi-
culties posed by Gleitman and subsequent cases.
Although some commentators regarded the intermediate ap-
pellate decisions in Park and Becker as "the first step toward
judicial acceptance of the theory of wrongful life,"81 the two
cases, consolidated for appeal, were reversed on that issue by the
New York Court of Appeals.2 The court perceived "two flaws, 83
corresponding roughly to the two rationales propounded in
Gleitman, in the plaintiffs' wrongful life claims. First, relying on
policy considerations, the court held that the infants did not suf-
fer "any legally cognizable injury.... Whether it is better never
to have been born at all than to have been born with even gross
deficiencies is a mystery more properly to be left to the philoso-
phers and the theologians."'8 ' While implicitly recognizing the ef-
DOWN'S SYNDROME (Rev. ed. 1969); L. PENROSE & G. SMITH, DOWN'S ANOMALY (1966);
Kirman, Down's Syndrome, in 1 MENTAL RETARDATION 57 (J. Wortis ed. 1970).
78. There is a significant correlation between the incidence of Down's syndrome and
maternal age, with the defect occurring approximately once in every two thousand births
to mothers under twenty-five years of age and approximately one in every sixty births to
women over forty. A. EMERY, ELEMENTS OF MEDICAL GENETIcs 61-62 (3d ed. 1974); C.
STERN, supra note 19, at 112. The risk of bearing children afflicted with Down's syn-
drome begins to increase sharply with women in their mid-thirties and the point at
which the risk becomes significant is taken by most medical authorities to be a maternal
age of thirty-five. Galbus, The Antenatal Detection of Genetic Disorders, 48 OBST. &
GYN. 497, 498 (1976). See Friedman, supra note 44, at 100.
79. See Becker, 46 N.Y.2d at 406, 386 N.E.2d at 809, 413 N.Y.S.2d at 897.
80. 60 A.D.2d at 588, 400 N.Y.S.2d at 120.
81. Cohen, supra note 32, at 232. See, e.g., Note, 2 Am. J. TRIAL ADvoc. 107, 111-13
(1978).
82. Becker, 46 N.Y.2d 401, 386 N.E.2d 807, 413 N.Y.S.2d 895.
83. Id. at 411, 386 N.E.2d at 812, 413 N.Y.S.2d at 900.
84. Id. at 411, 386 N.E.2d at 812, 413 N.Y.S.2d at 900.
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fect of Roe v. Wade on prior antiabortion arguments,85 the court
described the policy being applied as "the very nearly uniform
high value which the law and mankind has placed on human life,
rather than its absence."8 Second, the court explained that "a
cause of action brought on behalf of an infant seeking recovery
for wrongful life demands a calculation of damages dependent
upon a comparison between the Hobson's choice of life in an im-
paired state and nonexistence. This comparison the law is not
equipped to make.8 7 The court also expressed concern that lia-
bility would expand from severe defects to "less than perfect
birth[s]"88 and that recognition of the claim would preempt a
legislative prerogative.8 In contrast, the court held that the par-
ents' wrongful birth claims were judicially cognizable because
they fell within the traditional tort framework and alleged ascer-
tainable damages.90
In Berman v. Allan,9 the New Jersey Supreme Court joined
the growing ranks of courts recognizing wrongful birth claims"
but continued to reject the filial claim for wrongful life. 3 The
facts in Berman were quite similar to those in Becker and fo-
cused on the parents' deprivation of the opportunity for an in-
formed decision to abort the fetus because of the defendant ob-
stetricians' failure to apprise the plaintiff's parents of the
availability of amniocentesis and the correlation between Down's
syndrome and advanced maternal age.9 4 Although the court re-
fused to overrule Gleitman with respect to the wrongful life
claim, the reasoning of the two cases differed in a number of
aspects. The court explicitly abandoned the antiabortion ratio-
nale9 5 and significantly revised the damages argument. "[W]ere
the measure of damages our sole concern, it is possible that
some judicial remedy could be fashioned which would redress
85. Id. at 411, 386 N.E.2d at 812, 413 N.Y.S.2d at 900.
86. Id. at 411, 386 N.E.2d at 812, 413 N.Y.S.2d at 900.
87. Id. at 412, 386 N.E.2d at 812, 413 N.Y.S.2d at 900.
88. Id. at 411, 386 N.E.2d at 812, 413 N.Y.S.2d at 900.
89. Id. at 412, 386 N.E.2d at 812, 413 N.Y.S.2d at 901.
90. Id. at 413, 386 N.E.2d at 813, 413 N.Y.S.2d at 901.
91. 80 N.J. 421, 404 A.2d 8 (1979).
92. Id. at 430-34, 404 A.2d at 13-15.
93. Id. at 426-30, 404 A.2d at 11-13.
94. Id. at 424-25, 404 A.2d at 10.
95. See id. at 431-32, 404 A.2d at 13-14.
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plaintiff, if only in part, for injuries suffered." 96 Instead, the
court premised its decision on the absence of cognizable dam-
ages and supported this conclusion with the policy that
"life-whether experienced with or without a major physical
handicap-is more precious than non-life. '97 Thus, Berman and
Becker represent a refinement and distillation of the rationales
originally proposed in Gleitman, with wrongful life damages
characterized as uncognizable rather than unascertainable and
the abortion issue ostensibly deleted from the policy considera-
tions. To some extent, the damages rationale was subsumed by
policy arguments based on- the sanctity of human life,98 since
those considerations underlie the conclusion that the damages
are not cognizable. The arguments advanced in Berman and
Becker form the basis for subsequent rejections of wrongful life
claims. 99
Curlender v. Bio-Science Laboratories,0 0 a 1980 decision of
the California Court of Appeals, was the first case since Park
and Becker to recognize a wrongful life claim. In Curlender, the
infant plaintiff sued a physician and two medical laboratories 0 1
for negligent performance of a genetic screening test for Tay-
Sachs disease, 0 2 which allegedly prevented an informed parental
decision to avoid the plaintiff's conception or "to avail them-
selves of an amniocentesis or an abortion." 103 After thoroughly
reviewing the decisional law,104 the court noted both the "grad-
ual retreat from the position of accepting 'impossibility of mea-
suring damages' as the sole ground for barring the infant's right
96. Id. at 428, 404 A.2d at 12 (emphasis in original).
97. Id. at 429, 404 A.2d at 12. This reasoning was viewed as determinative by the
New Jersey Supreme Court in a subsequent wrongful life case. Schroeder v. Perkel, 87
N.J. 53, 432 A.2d 834 (1981). o
98. See Phillips I, 508 F. Supp. at 543; Capron, Tort Liability in Genetic Counsel-
ing, 79 COLUM. L. REV. 618, 650 (1979).
99. Phillips I, 508 F. Supp. 537; Robak, 503 F. Supp. 982; Turpin, 119 Cal. App. 3d
690, 174 Cal. Rptr. 128.
100. 106 Cal. App. 3d 811, 165 Cal. Rptr. 477 (1980).
101. Id. at 815, 165 Cal. Rptr. at 479.
102. Tay-Sachs disease, also known as infantile amaurotic idiocy, is a genetic disor-
der found primarily in Ashkenazic Jews. C. STERN, supra note 32, at 180. For a descrip-
tion of the characteristics of Tay-Sachs disease, see STEDMAN'S MEDICAL DICTIONARY,
supra note 68, at 410, 1311.
103. 106 Cal. App. 3d at 817, 165 Cal. Rptr. at 480.
104. Id. at 818-26, 165 Cal. Rptr. at 481-86.
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of recovery" 105 and "the monumental implications of Roe v.
Wade ... ."106 Acknowledging the significance of policy argu-
ments in previous cases, the court suggested that "considera-
tions of public policy should include regard for social welfare as
affected by careful genetic counseling and medical proce-
dures,' 1 07 particularly in light of "the dramatic increase, in the
last few decades, of the medical knowledge and skill needed to
avoid genetic disaster."108
The reality of the "wrongful-life" concept is that such a plain-
tiff both exists and suffers, due to the negligence of others. It is
neither necessary nor just to retreat into meditation on the
mysteries of life. We need not be concerned with the fact that
had defendants not been negligent, the plaintiff might not have
come into existence at all. The certainty of genetic impairment
is no longer a mystery. In addition, a reverent appreciation of
life compels recognition that plaintiff, however impaired she
may be, has come into existence as a living person with certain
rights.1'0
9
The court held that the plaintiff was entitled to recover damages
for pain and suffering during her limited expected life; "any spe-
cial pecuniary loss resulting from the impaired condition" 110 and
punitive damages were also allowed by the court.11
While Curlender is cogently written and reflects considera-
ble preparation in its attempt to refute systematically the argu-
ments of Gleitman and its progeny, the precedential value of the
case is equivocal. On September 4,'1980, the California Supreme
Court denied defendants' petition for a hearing,11 2 perhaps indi-
cating some degree of approval of the intermediate appellate
court's opinion. 1 3 In 1981, however, another California court of
105. Id. at 827, 165 Cal. Rptr. at 486.
106. Id. at 827, 165 Cal. Rptr. at 487.
107. Id. at 827, 165 Cal. Rptr. at 486-87.
108. Id. at 827, 165 Cal. Rptr. at 487.
109. Id. at 830, 165 Cal. Rptr. at 488.
110. Id. at 832, 165 Cal. Rptr. at 489. The court indicated that these special dam-
ages would include any costs of care not covered by the parents' wrongful birth claim. Id.
at 832, 165 Cal. Rptr. at 490.
111. Id. at 832-33, 165 Cal. Rptr. at 490.
112. Curlender v. Bio-Science Laboratories, No. 2 Civ. 58192 Div. 1 (Cal. Sept. 4,
1980).
113. See DiGenova v. State Bd. of Educ., 57 Cal. 2d 167, 178, 367 P.2d 865, 871, 18
Cal. Rptr. 369, 375 (1962)(denial of petition does not express approval, but is not "with-
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appeals denied a wrongful life claim, asserting that "Curlender
avoids resolving this fundamental problem of measuring dam-
ages, that is, comparing the value of impaired life against no
life. ' 114 The court held: "[a]fter a thorough review of ... [the]
authorities, we reject Curlender as unsound under established
principles of law and as a sortie into areas of public policy
clearly within the competence of the Legislature."115 Thus, Cali-
fornia's position on this issue is presently unclear, and the out-
come depends on the ultimate resolution of Curlender and Tur-
pin by that state's supreme court.11 6
In summary, a historical review of wrongful life claims indi-
cates that they have not been received favorably by the courts;
seven of the eight jurisdictions that have considered wrongful
life claims do not presently recognize their validity,117 and one
jurisdiction remains unsettled.118  Dissatisfied life 19  and
unplanned life 2 0 claims have been uniformly unsuccessful. The
out significance"); Allstot v. Long Beach, 104 Cal. App. 2d 441, 446, 231 P.2d 498, 501
(1951)(denial means that lower court was not incorrect). But see People v. Triggs, 8 Cal.
3d 884, 890, 506 P.2d 232, 236, 106 Cal. Rptr. 408, 412 (1973)(when the appellate court's
opinion is in conflict with the law as stated by the Supreme Court, denial "is to be given
no weight").
114. Turpin v. Sortini, 119 Cal. App. 3d 690, 174 Cal. Rptr. 128, 131 (1981).
115. Id. at-, 174 Cal. Rptr. at 129.
116. Shortly after the California Supreme Court's denial of defendants' petition for
a hearing in Curlender, the parties reached an out-of-court settlement of both parental
and filial claims reported to be $1.6 million. Curlender v. Bio-Science Laboratories, Nos.
NW C 67506, NW C 67512 (Cal. Super. Ct. Sept. 11, 1981) (order approving settlement
of minor's claim). In Aragon v. University of Cal. Bd. of Trustees, No. 289628, a Superior
Court judge in Sacramento County California ruled that, based on the precedent of
Curlender, a wrongful life claim stated a valid cause of action; this ruling eventually led
to settlement of both the parental and filial claims during the course of the trial for
$900,000. N.Y. Times, Oct. 11, 1981, § Y, at 17, col. 6.
The confusion surrounding these issues under California law may soon be resolved
by the California Supreme Court, which has recently granted plaintiff's petition for a
hearing in Turpin. Turpin v. Sortini, No. -, Civ. 24319, Div. -, (Cal. Aug. 6, 1981).
117. These jurisdictions are Alabama, Robak, 503 F. Supp. 982; New Jersey, e.g.,
Berman, 80 N.J. 421, 404 A.2d 8; New York, e.g., Becker, 46 N.Y.2d 401, 386 N.E.2d 807,
413 N.Y.S.2d 895; Pennsylvania, Gildiner, 451 F. Supp. 692; South Carolina, Phillips I,
508 F. Supp. 537; Texas, Smith v. United States, 392 F. Supp. 654; and Wisconsin,
Dumer, 69 Wis. 2d 766, 233 N.W.2d 372.
118. Compare Curlender, 106 Cal. App. 3d 811, 165 Cal. Rptr. 477 with Turpin, 119
Cal. App. 3d 690, 174 Cal. Rptr. 128. See notes 100-115 and accompanying text supra.
119. Zepeda, 41 Ill. App. 2d 240, 190 N.E.2d 849; Williams, 46 Misc. 2d 824, 260
N.Y.S.2d 953; Slawek, 62 Wis. 2d 295, 215 N.W.2d 9 (counterclaim).
120. LaPoint, 409 F. Supp. 118; Elliott, 361 So. 2d 546; Stills, 55 Cal. App. 3d 698,
127 Cal. Rptr. 652; Clegg, 89 Misc. 2d 510, 391 N.Y.S.2d 966; Speck, 268 Pa. Super. Ct.
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overwhelming majority of these decisions deny the claims be-
cause of conceptual difficulties in the calculation of damages cre-
ated by the perceived necessity of comparing impaired life with
nonexistence, based on considerations of the sanctity of all
human life notwithstanding incidental defects. The few cases
recognizing wrongful life claims have focused on the pain and
suffering attributable to the defect, without convincingly rebut-
ting the theoretical or philosophical problems attendant to the
damages calculation.
C. Theoretical Analysis of the Claim
"[T]he fog produced by the 'wrongful life' label... contin-
ues to enshroud cases brought on the children's behalf and to
prevent analytical clarity.1 21 Nevertheless,
[i]rrespective of the label coined, . . . [the] complaints sound
essentially in negligence or medical malpractice. As in any
cause of action founded upon negligence, a successful plaintiff
must demonstrate the existence of a duty, the breach of which
may be considered the proximate cause of the damages suf-
fered by the injured party.122
Thus, it is necessary to examine the theoretical underpinnings of
wrongful life claims to determine whether the claims fall within
the traditional tort framework.
1. Duty.-The view that the common law did not recognize
a legal duty to the unborn was first articulated by Justice
Holmes in Dietrich v. Inhabitants of Northampton.1 28 For sixty-
two years, most courts denied recovery in tort for prenatal inju-
ries,124 based "on the assumption that a child en ventre sa mere
has no juridical existence, and is so intimately united with its
mother as to be a part of her and as a consequence is not to be
342, 408 A.2d 496.
121. Capron, supra note 98, at 647.
122. Becker, 46 N.Y.2d at 410, 386 N.E.2d at 811, 413 N.Y.S.2d at 899.
123. 138 Mass. 14 (1884). Justice Holmes rejected certain analogies to property and
criminal law, and relying primarily on the absence of common-law precedent directly on
point, held that an unborn child was a part of the mother to which no independent legal
duty was owed. Id. at 16-17.
124. Allaire v. St. Luke's Hosp., 184 Ill. 359, 56 N.E. 638 (1900); Dietrich v. Inhabi-
tants of Northampton, 138 Mass. 14 (1884); Drobner v. Peters, 232 N.Y. 220, 133 N.E.
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regarded as a separate, distinct, and individual entity." ''2 In
1946, however, the United States District Court for the District
of Columbia rejected the "Dietrich rule" in Bonbrest v. Kotz1 26
and upheld a claim brought on behalf of a viable infant for pre-
natal medical malpractice. Noting that "[t]he law is presumed to
keep pace with the sciences .. ,,127 the court concluded that a
child, if viable and born alive, could maintain an action for pre-
natal injuries. 128 The decision in Bonbrest prompted "Itlhe most
spectacular[ly] abrupt reversal of a well settled rule in the whole
history of the law of torts," 129 and by 1972, every jurisdiction
that had addressed the issue recognized some legal duty to an
unborn child for prenatal injuries.130
In the context of wrongful life suits, two difficulties remain.
First, although cases of previability negligence by the physi-
cian '31 may present a problem in jurisdictions that strictly ad-
here to the viability requirement of Bonbrest, most recent deci-
sions allow recovery for negligence occurring between conception
and viability if the child is subsequently born alive.1 32 Moreover,
125. Bonbrest v. Kotz, 65 F. Supp. 138, 139 (D.D.C. 1946). Accord, Allaire v. St.
Luke's Hosp., 184 IMI. 359, 368, 56 N.E. 638, 640 (1900); Dietrich v. Inhabitants of North-
ampton, 138 Mass. 14, 16-17 (1884). Contra, Scott v. McPheeters, 33 Cal. App. 2d 629, 92
P.2d 678 (1939)(decision based on state statute); Cooper v. Blanck, 39 So. 2d 352 (La.
App. 1923)(based on state statute).
126. 65 F. Supp. 138 (D.D.C. 1946).
127. Id. at 143.
128. Id. at 141-42. The court rejected the argument advanced in Dietrich based on
the lack of precedent, observed that "[t]he common law is not an arid and sterile thing,
... static and inert," id. at 142, and emphasized the paramount importance of the
"right .. .of the individual in his possession and enjoyment of his life, his limbs and his
body .... " Id.
129. W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS 336 (4th ed. 1971).
130. E.g., Huskey v. Smith, 289 Ala. 52, 265 So. 2d 596 (1972); Smith v. Brennan, 31
N.J. 353, 157 A.2d 497 (1960); Woods v. Lancet, 303 N.Y. 349, 102 N.E.2d 691 (1951);
Hall v. Murphy, 236 S.C. 257, 113 S.E.2d 790 (1960). See generally Annot., 40 A.L.R.3d
1222 (1971). See also Kader, The Law of Tortious Prenatal Death Since Roe v. Wade,
45 Mo. L. REv. 639 (1980); Morrison, Torts Involving the Unborn-A Limited Cosmol-
ogy, 31 BAYLOR L. REv. 131 (1979).
Under South Carolina law, "a cause of action for wrongful death exists if, at the
time of the negligent act, the fetus is viable, regardless of whether it survives to birth."
Phillips I, 508 F. Supp. at 542 (citing Fowler v. Woodward, 244 S.C. 608, 613,'138 S.E.2d
42, 44 (1964)). See Hall v. Murphy, 236 S.C. 257, 113 S.E.2d 790 (1960).
131. E.g., Phillips I, 508 F. Supp. at 542.
132. E.g., Wolfe v. Isbell, 291 Ala. 327, 280 So. 2d 758 (1973); Sana v. Brown, 35 Ill.
App. 2d 425, 183 N.E.2d 187 (1962); Womack v. Buchorn, 384 Mich. 718, 187 N.W.2d 218
(1971); Bennett v. Hymers, 101 N.H. 483, 147 A.2d 108 (1958); Smith v. Brenna, 31 N.J.
353, 157 A.2d 497 (1960); Sinkler v. Kneale, 401 Pa. 267, 164 A.2d 93 (1960); Sylvia v.
19
Rogers: Wrongful Life and Wrongful Birth: Medical Malpractice in Genetic
Published by Scholar Commons, 1982
SOUTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
"the technical aspects of viability could be avoided by constru-
ing the physician's duty to advise and to test as a continuing or
ongoing duty."' 13 Second, in a few wrongful life cases, negligence
may precede conception.' 4 A number of recent decisions, em-
phasizing the foreseeability of the harm, have "permit[ted] an
infant, born alive, to bring an action for injuries arising out of
preconception negligent conduct.' 1 35 These decisions recognize
that "public policy no longer prevents a preconception duty
from arising, so long as the plaintiff was foreseeably injured by
the defendant's conduct."' 6 Thus, questions concerning the ex-
istence of a legal duty, whether prenatal, previability, or precon-
ception, do not seem to preclude actions for wrongful life.'
2. Breach.-As with any medical malpractice action, the
plaintiff in a wrongful life claim must be able to show that the
physician's failure to advise or test the parents concerning the
particular fetal risks at issue breached the applicable standard
of care.138 Because "reproductive counseling involves predictive
'diagnosis' based upon risk factors,"'' 39 physicians are required to
provide comprehensive genetic counseling and fetal testing only
in those pregnancies in which the appearance of certain risk fac-
tors renders the fetal risks foreseeable, and failure to counsel
and test breaches the standard of care. 4" The most significant
Gobeille, 101 R.I. 76, 220 A.2d 222 (1966).
133. Phillips I, 508 F. Supp. at 542.
134. E.g., Curlender, 106 Cal. App. 3d 811, 165 Cal. Rptr. 477.
135. Bergstreser v. Mitchell, 577 F.2d 22, 25 (8th Cir. 1978). See, e.g., Jorgensen v.
Meade Johnson Laboratories, Inc., 483 F.2d 237 (10th Cir. 1973); Renslow v. Mennonite
Hosp., 67 Ill. 2d 348, 367 N.E.2d 1250 (1977). In Renslow, the Illinois Supreme Court
stated that "a duty may exist to one foreseeably harmed though he be unknown and
remote in time and place." Id. at 357, 367 N.E.2d at 1254-55. See Zepeda, 41 Ill. App. 2d
at 250, 190 N.E.2d at 853; Park, 88 Misc. 2d at 230, 387 N.Y.S.2d at 210; Endresz v.
Friedberg, 24 N.Y.2d 478, 485-86, 248 N.E.2d 901, 905, 301 N.Y.S.2d 65, 70 (1969). But
see Albala v. New York, 49 U.S.L.W. 2459 (N.Y. Sup. Ct., App. Div. Jan. 8, 1981).
136. Cohen, supra note 32, at 221-22.
137. "In fact, considerations of duty are never the substantive reasons for a decision,
but only the legal sounding explanation for it." White, The Right of Recovery for Prena-
tal Injuries, 12 LA. L. REv. 383, 401 (1952).
133. W. PROSSER, supra note 129, § 32. The South Carolina Supreme Court has re-
cently abandoned the locality rule in determining the standard of care in medical mal-
practice cases, "adopt[ing] a standard of care not bound by any geographical restric-
tions." King v. Williams, - S.C. -, 279 S.E.2d 618 (1981).
139. Capron, supra note 98, at 626.
140. Cohen, supra note 32, at 231; Milunsky & Reilly, supra note 45, at 77. "Merely
because a child is born defective does not necessarily mean a physician was negligent
732 [Vol. 33
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indicia of increased fetal risks are advanced maternal age, 141 pos-
itive family history of previous affected offspring or affected rel-
atives,14 2 and maternal infections during pregnancy.143 Racial
background is important in the case of genetic defects such as
Tay-Sachs disease and sickle-cell anemia, and carrier testing
may be indicated on that basis.14 4 Other pertinent facts include
a history of three or more miscarriages' 45 and exposure to terato-
genic agents. 46
Some wrongful life cases are not predicated on failure to
counsel or test but on inaccurate performance of screening
tests147 or misdiagnosis of afflictions present in previous chil-
dren. ' 48 Recovery under these circumstances also depends on the
plaintiff's demonstrating that the alleged negligence breached
the applicable standard of care. 49 In any case, although recovery
may in some instances be precluded by the requirement that the
physician's conduct must breach the standard of care imposed
by the particular jurisdiction, this requirement does not present
a theoretical bar to the recognition of all wrongful life claims.
3. Proximate Cause.-The causation issue in a wrongful life
claim is whether, "[b]ut for the physician's negligence, the par-
ents would have avoided conception, or aborted the pregnancy,
unless the plaintiff can prove the physician or other defendant did not perform up to the
level of standard skill and knowledge commonly possessed by other members of the med-
ical community." Trotzig, supra note 36, at 22. Thus, the mere allegation that a physi-
cian failed to perform an amniocentesis, without more, is unlikely to show a breach of
the standard of care. See Johnson v. Yeshiva Univ., 42 N.Y.2d 818, 819, 364 N.E.2d 1340,
1341, 396 N.Y.S.2d 647, 648 (1977).
141. C. STERN, supra note 32, at 422-23; Saul, et al., supra note 46, at 388. See note
78 supra. One group has suggested that amniocentesis should be performed as standard
procedure for pregnancies in which the mother is over the age of thirty-five. National
Institute of Child Health and Development, National Registry for Amniocentesis Study
Group, supra note 46, at 1472-73, 1475-76.
142. Saul, et al., supra note 46, at 388-89.
143. The most significant of these is rubella. See note 35 supra. Other maternal
infections that can produce congenital defects include toxoplasmosis and syphilis. W.
HAMILTON & H. MoSsMAN, supra note 15, at 206; C. STERN, supra note 30, at 421.
144. Feinman, supra note 46, at 41; Saul, et al., supra note 46, at 389. See note 111
supra.
145. Saul, et al., supra note 46, at 388, 389.
146. W. HAMILTON & H. MossmAN, supra note 15, at 206. Examples include certain
hormones, such as diethylstilboestrol (DES), chemical agents, such as thalidomide, and
physical agents such as x-rays. Id.
147. Curlender, 106 Cal. App. 3d 811, 165 Cal. Rptr. 477.
148. Schroeder, 87 N.J. 53, 432 A.2d 834.
149. Trotzig, supra note 36, at 26-27.
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and the child would not have existed." 150 Assuming that the par-
ents assert that they would have aborted the fetus if they had
been properly informed, "[tihe complaint states a sufficient
causal relationship between the alleged negligence of the defen-
dants and the failure of... [the parents] to obtain an abortion
to defeat a motion for judgment on the pleadings based on a
lack of proximate cause."''
Some wrongful life decisions misperceive the causation issue
by emphasizing that the physician's negligence did not produce
or exacerbate the plaintiff's injuries. 152 "However, this argument
misinterprets the gravamen of the complaint, which is that the
physician's negligence precluded any parental decision to abort
the fetus."' 53 Although medical malpractice actions for tortious
prenatal injury assert that a physician has injured a child who
would otherwise have been born whole, wrongful life actions
claim that the physician has caused the birth of an injured child.
Assertion in a wrongful life case that the defendant's negligence
did not cause the defect, therefore, merely states a corollary to
the definition of the claim.""
The distinction between the two causes of action is illus-
trated by comparing Gleitman v. Cosgrove,'"5 a wrongful life
case involving congenital rubella, with Scales v. United
States,5 1 a prenatal tort case involving the same defect. In
Gleitman, the plaintiff alleged that the physician's negligence in
failing to inform the parents of the increased risk of congenital
defects from the mother's rubella infection during pregnancy
precluded an informed parental decision to abort the fetus and
resulted in plaintiff's birth with congenital rubella. 57 In Scales,
the plaintiff alleged that the physician's negligence in adminis-
tering a rubella vaccination to the mother while she was preg-
nant produced a maternal rubella infection and resulted in the
150. Comment, 54 TUL. L. REV. 480, 491 (1980).
151. Gildiner, 451 F. Supp. at 695. See, e.g., Phillips 1, 508 F. Supp. at 542-43.
152. E.g., Smith v. United States, 392 F. Supp. at 655; Gleitman, 49 N.J. at 27-28,
227 A.2d at 691-92.
153. Phillips 1, 508 F. Supp. at 542. See Cohen, supra note 32, at 222; Peters &
Peters, supra note 11, at 864; Comment, 54 TuL. L. REV. 480, 491 (1980).
154. See note 2 supra.
155. 49 N.J. 22, 227 A.2d 689.
156. No. A-79-CA-70 (W.D. Tex. June 9, 1981).
157. 49 N.J. at 26, 227 A.2d at 691.
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congenital rubella with which plaintiff was afflicted at birth.15
4. Damages.
a. Difficulty in measuring damages.-One component of the
damages argument advanced in Gleitman was the practical diffi-
culty of measuring damages;15 9 this facet of the damages argu-
ment was, however, explicitly discarded by the New Jersey Su-
preme Court in Berman v. Allan:16 0 "If a claim is legally
cognizable, mere difficulty in the ascertainment of damages
should be insufficient to preclude the action." 161 As one com-
mentator has observed, "[a] refusal to authorize damages on...
[this] ground appears more a matter of policy than of logic.
16 2
From a theoretical standpoint, difficulty in measuring damages
by itself does not prevent the assertion of wrongful life claims.
b. "Impossibility" of ascertaining damages.-The second
component of the damages argument advanced in Gleitman, and
the rationale emphasized by subsequent cases, is the "logical im-
possibility" of comparing life with nonexistence.'" As previously
noted,1 64 however, the "assertion of 'logical impossibility' ... is
less a matter of logic than of philosophy and value prefer-
ences;" '6 the damages argument is largely assimilated by the
policy considerations on which it is predicated. This argument is
158. No. A-79-CA-70 at 1-2. Since the early 1970s, it has been known that certain
"strains of vaccine virus could cross the placenta and infect the fetus .... [with] poten-
tial risks to the developing fetus ...." Preblud, et al., Fetal Risk Associated with Ru-
bella Vaccine, 246 J.A.M.A. 1413, 1413 (1981). Interestingly, the plaintiff in Scales ap-
parently asserted a wrongful life claim among his theories of recovery, alleging that the
defendants were negligent in "failing to inform... [the mother] of the adverse effects on
a fetus when the mother contracts rubella or German measles during the first trimester
of pregnancy and... [in] failing to advise and offer.., the option of an abortion." No.
A-79-CA-70 at 2. The court did not, however, discuss the wrongful life theory, and the
plaintiff's recovery in that case is probably attributable to his prenatal tort claim. See id.
at 7.
159. 49 N.J. at 28, 277 A.2d at 692.
160. 80 N.J. at 428, 404 A.2d at 12. See note 96 and accompanying text supra.
161. Phillips I, 508 F. Supp. at 542 (citing Story Parchment Co. v. Paterson Co., 282
U.S. 555, 563 (1931)). See, e.g., Thompson v. Brotherhood of Sleeping Car Porters, 367
F.2d 489 (4th Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 386 U.S. 960 (1967); Harrison & Sons, Inc. v. J.I.
Case Co., 180 F. Supp. 243 (E.D.S.C. 1960); Haltiwanger v. Barr, 258 S.C. 27, 186 S.E.2d
819 (1972).
162. Capron, supra note 98, at 648.
163. 49 N.J. at 28, 227 A.2d at 692. Accord, Berman, 80 N.J. at 428-29, 404 A.2d at
12; Becker, 46 N.Y.2d at 412, 386 N.E.2d at 812, 413 N.Y.S.2d 900.
164. See note 98 and accompanying text supra.
165. Capron, supra note 98, at 650.
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premised on the belief that because "life-whether experienced
with or without a major physical handicap-is more precious
than non-life,"106 there can be no damages as a matter of law.
Although this "felt intuition 6 7 is undoubtedly sincere, it can be
disputed both legally and factually.
In a slightly different context, the "right to die" cases "8
demonstrate that the state's interest in the preservation of life
can be displaced in some circumstances by an individual's right
of privacy. 6" Although these cases focus on an individual's right
to decline, as "infringements of bodily integrity,"170 treatment
necessary to prolong life, they nonetheless recognize, at least im-
plicitly, that death may be a preferable and legally cognizable
alternative to a severely burdened life. An even closer analogy to
the damages calculation in a wrongful life claim is furnished by
diethylstilbestrol (DES) litigation.1 7 1
In contrast to other pharmaceutical product liability cases in-
volving prenatal injuries... the damages comparison is rather
elusive.... [D]amages attributable to [DES] would be mea-
sured by comparing the condition of the plaintiff with the
drug-induced carcinoma to her presumed condition had her
mother not been prescribed the drug-which, ironically, could
be nonexistence, since the drug was prescribed to decrease the
incidence of spontaneous abortions in high-risk mothers.
172
166. Berman, 80 N.J. at 429, 404 A.2d at 12. See, e.g., Phillips I, 508 F. Supp. at
543; Gleitman, 49 N.J. at 30, 227 A.2d at 693; Becker, 46 N.Y.2d at 411, 386 N.E.2d at
812, 413 N.Y.S.2d at 900. See Stewart, 58 Misc. 2d at 436, 296 N.Y.S.2d at 46.
167. Gleitman, 49 N.J. at 30, 227 A.2d at 693.
168. E.g., Superintendent of Belchertown State School v. Saikewicz, 373 Mass. 728,
370 N.E.2d 417 (1977); In re Quinlan, 70 N.J. 10, 355 A.2d 647 (1976), cert. denied, 429
U.S. 922 (1976). See Fletcher, Prolonging Life, 42 WASH. L. REv. 999 (1967); Note, In-
formed Consent and the Dying Patient, 83 YALE L.J. 1632 (1974).
169. Saikewicz, 373 Mass. at 739, 370 N.E.2d at 424; In re Quinlan, 70 N.J. at 40-41,
355 A.2d at 663-64.
170. Saikewicz, 373 Mass. at 739, 370 N.E.2d at 424. See In re Quinlan, 70 N.J. at
41, 355 A.2d at 664.
171. Phillips I, 508 F. Supp. at 543 n.12. DES has been shown to cause certain fetal
disorders when prescribed to pregnant women. See W. HAMILTON & H. MossMAN, supra
note 15, at 206. Consequently, the drug has been the subject of numerous pharmaceutical
products liability cases. E.g., Katz v. Eli Lilly & Co., 84 F.R.D. 378 (E.D.N.Y. 1979);
Sindell v. Abbott Laboratories, 26 Cal. 3d 588, 607 P.2d 924, 163 Cal. Rptr. 132, cert.
denied, 449 U.S. 912 (1980); Abel v. Eli Lilly & Co., 94 Mich. App. 59, 289 N.W.2d 20
(1980). For a thorough examination of DES litigation, see Abrahams & Musgrave, The
DES Labyrinth, 33 S.C.L. REv. 663 (1982).
172. Phillips I, 508 F. Supp. at 544 n.12.
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Although this analysis "is, admittedly, . . . somewhat artificial
and speculative . . .,,,17 it suggests that a damages calculation
necessitating the comparison of defective life with nonexistence
does not present an insuperable legal obstacle to the prosecution
of a tort claim.
The assertion that life is always preferable to nonexistence
can also be attacked on a more practical leveL In Berman, the
court noted that "[n]otwithstanding her affliction . . . , [the
plaintiff], by virtue of her birth, will be able to love and be loved
and to experience happiness and pleasure-emotions which are
truly the essence of life and which are far more valuable than
the suffering she may endure."174 In a particular wrongful life
suit, this conclusion may indeed be true, but it is not invariably
or necessarily true. "Common sense tells us that nonexistence
could be preferable to life with certain defects. ' 17 5 Some defects
are not sufficiently severe to preclude the afflicted individual
from deriving any benefit from life; the congenital deafness at
issue in Turpin is an example of such a defect.17 6 Conversely, it
is difficult to comprehend how a child afflicted with polycystic
kidney disease, which is uniformly fatal in infancy,1 77 can possi-
bly derive the benefits described in Berman. An extreme exam-
ple "of the horrendous suffering that can result from a genetic
disease... 1 7 8 is provided by the Lesch-Nyhan syndrome, a ge-
netically-based enzyme deficiency that generally "leads to death
in childhood"17 9 and is characterized by severe motor defects
and mental retardation:180 "[aiffected children mutilate them-
selves by chewing their lips and fingers and their behavior to-
ward others includes spitting, biting, and hitting."181 To hold
173. Id.
174. Berman, 80 N.J. at 430, 404 A.2d at 13.
175. Kelley, Wrongful Life, Wrongful Birth, and Justice in Tort Law, 1979 WASH.
U.L.Q. 919, 937 (1979). See, e.g., Note, 55 MINN. L. REv. 58, 65-66, 74-75 (1970); Com-
ment, 39 ALB. L. REv. 221, 240 (1975). See also Note, 49 IowA L. REv. 1005, 1009 (1964).
176. Turpin, 119 Cal. App. 3d 690, 174 Cal. Rptr. 128. See Comment, 39 ALB. L.
REV. 221, 239 (1975).
177. Perkoff, supra note 68, at 433. In Park, the plaintiff died at two and one-half
years of age as a result of polycystic kidney disease. 60 A.D.2d at 81, 400 N.Y.S.2d at
111.
178. Capron, supra note 98, at 651 n.151.
179. C. STERN, supra note 19, at 724.
180. Id.; Nyhan, Clinical Features of the Lesch-Nyhan Syndrome, 130 ARCH. IN-
TERN. MED. 186 (1972).
181. C. STERN, supra note 19, at 724.
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that, as a matter of law, a child afflicted with a severe congenital
defect and forced to bear such a burdened existence derives
emotional benefits "which are far more valuable than the suffer-
ing [he] may endure '182 is misguided casuistry. Life, when char-
acterized by the benefits mentioned in Berman, is surely prefer-
able to nonexistence, but depending on circumstances, life
without those benefits-mere existence-may be less desirable
than nonexistence,1 83 a "state [in which] there is neither happi-
ness nor misery . ,,.18"
Nonetheless, while the damages argument of Gleitman and
its progeny is insufficient to preclude a wrongful life claim from
a theoretical standpoint, it is not altogether unfounded. Insofar
as the argument recognizes that both burdens and benefits flow
from the physician's negligence, it represents a legitimate and
essential insight into wrongful life damages. Calculation of dam-
ages in a wrongful life claim does not entail a comparison of life
with nonexistence; rather, it requires an assessment of the bur-
dens attributable to plaintiff's birth with congenital defects in
Aggressive, self-mutilating behavior is probably the most striking aspect of the
syndrome. Self-mutilation may begin as early as the eruption of teeth. It usu-
ally begins at least shortly thereafter. Most patients bit both their lips and
fingers destructively. Every patient we have seen has bitten his lips destruc-
tively, unless the primary teeth have been removed very early. In most pa-
tients, the hallmark of the syndrome is loss of tissue about the lips. Partial
amputations of the fingers are common.... In Hyperuricemic children, sensa-
tion is intact. They scream in pain while they bite themselves and they are
really happy only when securely protected from themselves by physical re-
straint. Many of these children scream all night until their parents or guardi-
ans are taught how to restrain them securely in bed.... When protective cov-
erings or restraints are removed their personality changes immediately. They
appear terrified. As they get older, they learn to call for help. Often while they
are screaming or calling they are already tearing at their flesh.
Nyhan, supra note 180, at 187-88.
182. Berman, 80 N.J. at 430, 404 A.2d at 13.
183. The argument that life is always preferable to nonexistence had its genesis in
dissatisfied life cases, see note 52 and accompanying text supra. The argument is consid-
erably more compelling, however, with respect to healthy children whose sole injury is
their illegitimate status, see Comment, 39 ALB. L. Rav. 221, 239 (1975), and, at least in
the context of wrongful life claims, the argument is not sufficiently persuasive to justify
the preclusion of damages as a matter of law. This conclusion is supported by the judi-
cial treatment of the same argument in wrongful birth cases, in which the argument has
been transformed from a rule of law barring wrongful birth claims to an element of the
damages calculation-the so-called "benefits rule." See notes 292-302 and accompanying
text infra. See'Holt, supra note 35, at 780.
184. Tedeschi, supra note 25, at 530, reprinted in 7 J. FAm. L. at 484.
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relation to the benefits that plaintiff can derive from life despite
the defects. Recognition that "[i]f the burdens outweigh the
benefits, then the plaintiff has been harmed by being born
'185
avoids the necessity of constructing mathematical models to cir-
cumvent supposed philosophical dilemmas in the calculation of
wrongful life damages'86 and relies instead upon the well-estab-
lished principle that "[w]hen the defendant's tortious conduct
has caused harm to the plaintiff... and ... has conferred a
special benefit to the interest of the plaintiff that was harmed,
the value of the benefit that was conferred is considered in miti-
gation of damages, to the extent that this is equitable.'
8 7
5. Policy Considerations.-The preceding analysis demon-
strates that wrongful life claims evince the requisite elements of
a negligence action and therefore conform to the traditional tort
framework. This conclusion has also been reached by some
courts,' 8 which candidly concede that "[t]he most potent argu-
ments.., against 'wrongful life' claims are predicated on public
policy considerations." 189 While some of these policy considera-
tions have been indirectly addressed in the context of dam-
ages,190 their crucial role in judicial rejections of wrongful life
claims necessitates additional scrutiny. A brief review of wrong-
ful birth claims, however, with particular attention to the evolu-
tion of policy considerations in those claims, provides a better
perspective for the examination of these decisive arguments.'91
III. WRONGFUL BIRTH
A. Background
Under circumstances in which a congenitally defective child
has an action for wrongful life, the parents have a corresponding
claim for "wrongful birth.' ' 9 2 Although the cases vary widely in
their treatment of damages, 93 a wrongful birth claim typically
185. Cohen, supra note 32, at 227.
186. See, e.g., Note 55, MINN. L. REv. 58, 66 (1970).
187. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 920 (1977).
188. Curlender, 106 Cal. App. 3d at 829-30, 165 Cal. Rptr. at 488-89. See Phillips I,
508 F. Supp. at 542-43.
189. 508 F. Supp. at 543.
190. See notes 163-184 and accompanying text supra.
191. See notes 302-321 and accompanying text infra.
192. See note 3 supra.
193. See generally Note, Wrongful Birth Damages: Mandate and Mishandling by
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seeks recovery for the expense of caring for the child194 as well as
compensation for the emotional distress of the parents.1 95
Confusion engendered by overlapping terminology, which
has previously been discussed in the context of filial birth-re-
lated claims,198 is also present in the area of parental claims.
"Wrongful birth" has been used to describe both the parental
claim for medical malpractice in genetic counseling or prenatal
testing and the parental claim for medical malpractice or other
professional negligence in contraception.9 7 Because of important
distinctions between these causes of action, however, particu-
larly in the area of damages,198 the terms "wrongful birth" and
"wrongful pregnancy" are now generally used to differentiate the
claims.199  An action for wrongful pregnancy is commonly
brought by the parents of an unplanned child who allege that a
physician has negligently performed a contraceptive proce-
dure2 00 or that a pharmaceutical manufacturer or a pharmacist
has negligently prepared or dispensed a contraceptive prescrip-
tion.20 1 "Thus, "'wrongful pregnancy" actions typically involve a
healthy, but unwanted, child. "Wrongful birth" actions, on the
other hand, usually involve planned children who are born de-
Judicial Fiat, 13 VAL. U.L. REv. 127 (1978).
194. Some courts have allowed recovery for all expenses incident to raising the
child, while others have limited recovery to extraordinary expenses. Compare Robak, 658
F.2d at 479, with Becker, 46 N.Y.2d at 415, 386 N.E.2d at 814, 413 N.Y.S.2d at 902-03.
195. E.g., Berman, 80 N.J. at 426, 404 A.2d at 14. In Berman the "emotional dis-
tress" suffered by the parents was viewed as the sole element of their recovery, id., but
this view was subsequently modified to allow certain medical expenses incurred for the
child in addition to the emotional trauma experienced by the parents. Schroeder, 87 N.J.
53, 432 A.2d 234.
196. See notes 14-41 and accompanying text supra.
197. See, e.g., Custodio v. Bauer, 251 Cal. App. 2d 303, 59 Cal. Rptr. 463 (1967);
Annot., 83 A.L.R.3d 15 (1978); Robertson, Civil Liability Arising from "Wrongful Birth"
Following an Unsuccessful Sterilization Operation, 4 AM. J.L. & Man. 131 (1979).
198. See note 203 infra.
199. E.g., Phillips II, 508 F. Supp. at 545 n.1; Comment, 54 TuL. L. REv. 480, 483
(1980).
200. E.g., Stills v. Gratton, 55 Cal. App. 3d 698, 127 Cal. Rptr. 652 (1976)(unsuccess-
ful abortion); Sherlock v. Stillwater Clinic, 260 N.W.2d 169 (Minn. 1977)(unsuccessful
vasectomy); Betancourt v. Gaylor, 136 N.J. Super. 69, 344 A.2d 336 (1975)(unsuccessful
tubal ligation). Wrongful pregnancy claims have also been predicated on the failure to
diagnose pregnancy in sufficient time to allow an abortion. E.g., Ziemba v. Sternberg, 45
A.D.2d 230, 357 N.Y.S.2d 265 (1974). See note 35 supra.
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formed.' "1202 The use of terminology distinguishing these claims
is important in analyzing the theoretical issues raised by the
claims, but "[p]erhaps the most compelling justification for this
terminology is provided by those jurisdictions that recognize
'wrongful birth' claims, but not 'wrongful pregnancy' claims.120 3
As defined in this article, sixteen reported cases204 in eight juris-
dictions can properly be described as wrongful birth claims.
Wrongful pregnancy claims constitute a more extensive body of
case law.205
B. Historical Perspective
Because wrongful birth and wrongful life claims are usually
brought together, either in the same case2°0 or as companion
cases, 20 7 a historical examination of wrongful birth cases largely
202. Phillips II, 508 F. Supp. at 545 n.1 (emphasis in original)(quoting Comment, 54
Tu. L. REv. 480, 485 (1980)). Some wrongful pregnancy claims involve unplanned chil-
dren who, coincidentally, are born with congenital defects, e.g., LaPoint v. Shirley, 409 F.
Supp. 118 (W.D. Tex. 1976), thus minimizing the distinction in damages between wrong-
ful pregnancy claims and wrongful birth claims.
203. Phillips II, 508 F. Supp. at 545 n.1. Two jurisdictions utilize this approach,
recognizing wrongful birth claims while denying wrongful pregnancy claims based on the
absence of damages under the so-called "benefits rule." Compare Jacobs, 519 S.W.2d 846
and Dumer, 69 Wis. 2d 766, 233 N.W.2d 372 (wrongful birth cases) with Terrell v. Gar-
cia, 496 S.W.2d 124 (Tex. Civ. App. 1973), cert denied, 415 U.S. 927 (1974) and Rieck v.
Medical Protective Co., 64 Wis. 2d 514, 219 N.W.2d 242 (1974)(wrongful pregnancy
cases). For further discussion of the benefits rule, see notes 211, 220 & 292-301 and ac-
companying text infra. See Holt, supra note 35, at 780-83.
204. Robak, 658 F.2d 471; Phillips II, 508 F. Supp. 544; Gildiner, 451 F. Supp. 692;
Turpin, 119 Cal. App. 3d 690, 174 Cal. Rptr. 128; Schroeder, 87 N.J. 53, 432 A.2d 834;
Berman, 80 N.J. 421, 404 A.2d 8; Gleitman, 49 N.J. 22, 227 A.2d 689; Becker, 60 A.D.2d
587, 400 N.Y.S.2d 119; Park, 60 A.D.2d 80, 400 N.Y.S.2d 110; Karlsons, 57 A.D.2d 73,
394 N.Y.S.2d 933; Johnson, 53 A.D.2d 523, 384 N.Y.S.2d 455; Greenberg, 47 A.D.2d 765,
367 N.Y.S.2d 966; Howard v. Lecher, 53 A.D.2d 420, 386 N.Y.S.2d 460 (1972), afl'd, 42
N.Y.2d 109, 366 N.E.2d 64, 397 N.Y.S.2d 363 (1977); Stewart, 58 Misc. 2d 432, 296
N.Y.S.2d 41; Jacobs, 519 S.W.2d 846; Dumer, 69 Wis. 2d 766, 233 N.W.2d 372. See An-
demon v. Wagner, 61 Ill. App. 3d 822, 378 N.E.2d 805 (1978)(action barred by statute of
limitations).
205. E.g., Bishop v. Byrne, 265 F. Supp. 460 (S.D.W. Va. 1967); Stills v. Gratton, 55
Cal. App. 3d 698, 127 Cal. Rptr. 652 (1976); Public Health Trust v. Brown, 388 So. 2d
1084 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1980); Hackworth v. Hart, 474 S.W.2d 377 (Ky. 1971); Sherlock
v. Stillwater Clinic, 260 N.W.2d 169 (Minn. 1977); Betancourt v. Gaylor, 136 N.J. Super.
69, 344 A.2d 336 (1975); Ziemba v. Sternberg, 45 A.D.2d 230, 357 N.Y.S.2d 265 (1974).
See generally Annot., supra note 197.
206. E.g., Gleitman, 49 N.J. 22, 227 A.2d 689.
207. E.g., Phillips II, 508 F. Supp. 544 (wrongful birth claim); Phillips I, 508 F.
Supp. 537 (wrongful life claim).
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entails a reprise of the previous examination of wrongful life
claims. Although these examinations focus on many of the same
cases, they nevertheless reveal a marked divergence in the judi-
cial treatment of the two causes of action.
In Gleitman v. Cosgrove, °8 the New Jersey Supreme Court,
confronted with an issue of first impression, rejected the par-
ents' wrongful birth claim on basically the same grounds ad-
vanced for the denial of the wrongful life claim.209 First, the
court pointed to the difficulty of measuring damages: "a court
would have to evaluate the ... intangible, unmeasurable, and
complex human benefits of motherhood and fatherhood and
weigh these against the alleged emotional and money injuries.
Such a proposed weighing is ... impossible to perform ....
As with the court's treatment of wrongful life, however, the
"damages argument was, in reality, a thinly-disguised policy ar-
gument, borrowed from earlier 'wrongful pregnancy' cases,...
which presupposed that the birth of a child was a 'blessed
event,' the benefits of which would as a matter of law outweigh
its burdens."211  Second, the court explicitly relied on certain
public policy considerations2 12 with two distinct components. Al-
though the court expressly invoked a perceived public policy
against abortion,213 it also couched the policy argument in
broader terms:
The sanctity of the single human life is the decisive factor in
this suit in tort.... We are not talking here about the breeding
of prize cattle. It may have been easier for the mother and less
expensive for the father to have terminated the life of their
child while he was an embryo, but these alleged detriments
cannot stand against the preciousness of the single human life
to support a remedy in tort.
214
As with the denial of the wrongful life claim, the court's decision
was premised on an underlying assumption: "[ilt is basic to the
208. 49 N.J. 22, 227 A.2d 689.
209. See notes 48-57 and accompanying text supra.
210. 49 N.J. at 29, 227 A.2d at 693.
211. Phillips II, 508 F. Supp. at 549 (citing Christensen v. Thornby, 192 Minn. 123,
255 N.W. 620 (1934)); Shaheen v. Knight, 6 Lycoming Rep. 19, 11 Pa. D.&C.2d 41
(1957)).
212. 49 N.J. at 30-31, 227 A.2d at 693.
213. Id. at 30, 227 A.2d at 693. See note 55 supra. But see note 63 supra.
214. 49 N.J. at 30-31, 227 A.2d at 693 (citation omitted).
742 [Vol. 33
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human condition to seek life and hold on to it however heavily
burdened."21 The two rationales advanced in Gleitman were
substantially adopted by the next jurisdiction to consider a
wrongful birth claim. In Stewart v. Long Island College Hospi-
tal,216 a New York court emphasized the antiabortion issue in
denying a wrongful birth claim.21
During the early 1970s legal developments concerning abor-
tion 218 and scientific advancements in prenatal testing219 signifi-
cantly affected judicial perception of wrongful birth claims. The
assertion during this period of the first wrongful pregnancy
claims was another important consideration in the development
of the legal groundwork for wrongful birth claims. Early wrong-
ful pregnancy actions had been uniformly unsuccessful because
of the presumption that, as a matter of law, the benefits con-
ferred by birth were greater than the burdens.220 Beginning with
Custodio v. Bauer2 1 in 1967, however, the benefits rule was
gradually transformed from an absolute bar to recovery in
wrongful pregnancy cases to a flexible principle governing miti-
gation of damages.222 Thus, the "intangible, unmeasurable, and
complex human benefits of motherhood and fatherhood,
'223
which the court in Gleitman had found impossible to ascertain
in a wrongful birth claim,2 were found to be calculable in the
first successful wrongful pregnancy cases.225
In 1975, as a result of these developments, two state su-
215. Id. at 30, 227 A.2d at 693.
216. 58 Misc. 2d 432, 296 N.Y.S.2d 41 (Sup. Ct. 1968), modified, 35 A.D.2d 531, 313
N.Y.S.2d 502 (1970), aff'd mem., 30 N.Y.2d 695, 293 N.E.2d 616, 332 N.Y.S.2d 640
(1972).
217. 58 Misc. 2d at 436-37, 296 N.Y.S.2d at 45-46.
218. E.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973). See notes 61-63 and accompanying text
supra.
219. See notes 42-47 and accompanying text supra.
220. The benefits rule was first articulated in Christensen v. Thornby, 192 Minn.
123, 255 N.W. 620 (1934). See note 211 and accompanying text supra and note 203
supra.
221. 251 Cal. App. 2d 303, 59 Cal. Rptr. 463 (1967).
222. See, e.g., Troppi, 31 Mich. App. at 255, 187 N.W.2d at 518-19.
223. Gleitman, 49 N.J. at 29, 227 A.2d at 693.
224. Id.
225. Troppi, 31 Mich. App. 240, 187 N.W.2d 511. Troppi and other successful
wrongful pregnancy cases also significantly affected the judicial perception of public pol-
icy considerations in birth-related claims. See note 298 and accompanying text infra.
1982]
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preme courts recognized wrongful birth claims.226 In Jacobs v.
Theimer,2 27 the Supreme Court of Texas allowed the parents to
recover for "[tihe economic burden related solely to the physical
defects of the child . . ."228 which had allegedly resulted from
the physician's misdiagnosis of a rubella infection in the
mother.2 29 The court held that the physician was under a duty to
warn of the risk in continuing the pregnancy.230 Noting that the
lower court had granted a summary judgment for the physician
based on "the prohibition against abortion in this state's penal
code in 1968, ' '231 the court recognized the importance of Roe v.
Wade232 and minimized the significance of policy considerations:
We do not regard the issue before us as requiring our decision
of the public policy either for or against abortion. This is a
matter of very different but very deep feeling. So long as no
violation of criminal statutes is proposed, the courts should re-
gard the question as one to be resolved by the wife and her
husband. At least, the courts should not penalize them for the
choice which these plaintiffs say that they would have made.233
Although the court disapproved of wrongful life claims,2  it held
unequivocally that wrongful birth claims were not barred by
public policy.285 In Dumer v. St. Michael's Hospital,23 6 the Wis-
consin Supreme Court, relying primarily on Jacobs,237 recog-
nized a cause of action for wrongful birth.23 8 Holding that the
physician had a duty to inform the mother of the probable ef-
fects of rubella on the fetus,239 the court concluded that, if the
parents could carry the burden of proof at trial, they were "enti-
226. Jacobs, 519 S.W.2d 846; Dumer, 69 Wis. 2d 766, 233 N.W.2d 372.
227. 519 S.W.2d at 847, 850.
228. Id. at 849. The court specifically disallowed child-rearing expenses beyond the
special medical expenses related to the defect, as well as damages for the parents' mental
anguish. Id.
229. Id. at 847.
230. Id. at 848.
231. Id. at 847. See Jacobs, 507 S.W.2d 288.
232. 519 S.W.2d at 847-48.
233. Id. at 848.
234. Id. (dictum following discussion of Gleitman).
235. Id. at 850.
236. 69 Wis. 2d 766, 233 N.W.2d 372 (1975).
237. Id. at 776 n.7, 233 N.W.2d at 377 n.7.
238. Id. at 776, 233 N.W.2d at 377.
239. Id. at 775, 233 N.W.2d at 377.
[Vol. 33
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tled to the damages ... sustained because of the deformity and
defects of the child.
'240
In Gildiner v. Thomas Jefferson University Hospital,24 1 the
United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsyl-
vania recognized a wrongful birth claim in a Tay-Sachs disease
case, finding that the plaintiffs had shown the requisite elements
of a cause of action predicated on negligence. 2  The court de-
clined to follow Gleitman and emphasized that Roe guaranteed
the "[p]arents... a constitutionally-protected right to obtain an
abortion during the first trimester of pregnancy, free of state in-
terference."' ' Indeed, the policy considerations advanced in
Gildiner were vastly different from those in Gleitman:
Society has an interest in insuring that genetic testing is prop-
erly performed and interpreted. The failure to properly per-
form or interpret an amniocentesis could cause either the abor-
tion of a healthy fetus, or the unwanted birth of a child
afflicted with Tay-Sachs disease. Either of these occurrences is
contrary to the public policy of Pennsylvania. The recognition
of a cause of action for negligence in the performance of ge-
netic testing would encourage the accurate performance of such
testing by penalizing physicians who fail to observe customary
standards of good medical practice.
244
The court authorized the recovery of damages for the child's
medical expenses, but reserved ruling on other possible elements
of damages. 2
45
The dichotomous approach of Jacobs, Dumer, and Gildiner,
recognizing wrongful birth claims while rejecting wrongful life
claims, set the pattern for subsequent cases. Although the deci-
sionai law in New York was limited to some extent by the prece-
dent of Stewart,2 46 the court of appeals implicitly overruled that
240. Id. at 776, 233 N.W.2d at 377.
241. 451 F. Supp. 692 (E.D. Pa. 1978).
242. Id. at 695-96.
243. Id. (citing Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973)).
244. Id. at 696.
245. Id.
246. See notes 216 & 217 and accompanying text supra. Some New York cases, fol-
lowing Stewart, clearly rejected wrongful birth claims on grounds similar to Gleitman.
E.g., Greenberg, 47 A.D.2d 765, 367 N.Y.S.2d 966. Other cases rejected wrongful birth
claims on other grounds, specifically the absence of a duty to the parents and the specu-
lativeness of emotional damages. E.g., Howard v. Lecher, 53 A.D.2d 420, 386 N.Y.S.2d
460 (1976), aff'd, 42 N.Y.2d 109, 366 N.E.2d 64, 397 N.Y.S.2d 363 (1977).
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opinion in Becker v. Schwartz,247 which held that the parental
claims in the two consolidated cases248 stated valid causes of ac-
tion. 49 Relying on Jacobs and Dumer, the court found that the
parental claims contained the necessary elements for a negli-
gence action 250 and suggested, without specifying the items to be
used in computation, that the parents' damages would include
their pecuniary loss 251 but did not include damages for emo-
tional harm.28 2
In Berman v. Allan,53 the New Jersey Supreme Court reaf-
firmed Gleitman's rejection of wrongful life claims254 but aban-
doned the rationale of the earlier case concerning wrongful birth.
Berman expressed strong disapproval of the damages argument
advanced in Gleitman: "to deny... [the plaintiffs] redress for
their injuries merely because damages cannot be measured with
precise exactitude would constitute a perversion of fundamental
principles of justice. 255 Recognizing the impact of Roe,256 the
court held that public policy considerations concerning abortion
could
no longer stand in the way of judicial recognition of a cause of
action founded upon wrongful birth. . . .Any other ruling
would in effect immunize from liability those in the medical
field providing inadequate guidance to persons who would
choose to exercise their constitutional right to abort a fetus
247. 46 N.Y.2d 401, 386 N.E.2d 807, 413 N.Y.S.2d 895 (1978). Arguably, two earlier
cases had implicitly overruled Stewart, but, as with Becker, neither of them expressly
addressed Stewart or its rationale. In Karlsons, 57 A.D.2d 73, 394 N.Y.S.2d 933, the
court apparently recognized the cause of action, disagreeing with the appellate division's
rejection of emotional damages in Howard v. Lecher; this decision, however, preceded
the court of appeals' affirmance of Howard. In Johnson, 53 A.D.2d 523, 384 N.Y.S.2d 455
(1976), the court also apparently recognized the validity of wrongful birth claims, but
rejected the particular claim in that case for failure to show a breach of the applicable
standard of care.
248. Becker, 60 A.D.2d 587, 400 N.Y.S.2d 119; Park, 60 A.D.2d 80, 400 N.Y.S.2d 110
(1977). See note 82 and accompanying text supra.
249. 46 N.Y.2d at 412, 386 N.E.2d at 813, 413 N.Y.S.2d at 901.
250. Id. at 412, 386 N.E.2d at 813, 413 N.Y.S.2d at 901.
251. Id. at 412, 386 N.E.2d at 813, 413 N.Y.S.2d at 901.
252. Id. at 413, 386 N.E.2d at 813, 413 N.Y.S.2d at 901 (citing Howard v. Lecher, 42
N.Y.2d 109, 366 N.E.2d 64, 397 N.Y.S.2d 363 (1977)). See note 246 supra.
253. 80 N.J. 421, 404 A.2d 8 (1979).
254. See notes 91-98 and accompanying text supra.
255. 80 N.J. at 433, 404 A.2d at 15 (citing Story Parchment Co. v. Paterson Co., 282
U.S. 555 (1931)).
256. 80 N.J. at 431, 404 A.2d at 13.
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which, if born, would suffer from genetic defects.2 57
While following the emerging trend in allowing the parents'
claim, Berman adopted an unusual posture with respect to dam-
ages; the court permitted damages for mental anguish2 58 but,
based on a peculiar application of the benefits rule, rejected all
expenses incident to the child's care:
259
In essence,... [the plaintiffs] desire to retain all the benefits
inhering in the birth of the child-i.e., the love and joy they
will experience as parents-while saddling the defendants with
the enormous expense attendant upon her hearing.... [W]e
find that such an award would be wholly disproportionate to
the culpability involved, and that allowance of such a recovery
would both constitute a windfall to the parents and place too
unreasonable a financial burden upon physicians. 26 0
The unique position of Berman on the issue of damages has re-
cently been modified by the New Jersey Supreme Court in
Schroeder v. Perkel,26 1 which awarded the parents "certain med-
ical expenses ' ' 262 related to the child's affliction.
Three other jurisdictions have adopted similar approaches
to wrongful birth claims. In Phillips v. United States,263 the
United States District Court for the District of South Carolina,
upholding a wrongful birth claim, observed that the "claim falls
within the traditional boundaries of negligence . "64 In
257. Id. at 431-32, 404 A.2d at 14.
258. Id. at 433-34, 404 A.2d at 14-15.
259. Id. at 432, 404 A.2d at 14.
260. Id. Ironically, Becker has used the benefits rule in refusing to recognize emo-
tional damage as "too speculative." 46 N.Y.2d at 415, 386 N.E.2d at 814, 413 N.Y.S.2d at
902 (despite the child's affliction, the "parents may yet experience a love that even an
abnormality cannot fully dampen"). The Becker court also observed, however, that this
argument was "dependent upon the extent of the affliction," id., which militates against
its use to bar, as a matter of law, either mental anguish or medical expenses in all wrong-
ful birth claims without reference to the particular factual circumstances.
261. 87 N.J. 53, 432 A.2d 834 (1981).
262. Id. at -, 432 A.2d at 841-42.
263. Phillips II, 508 F. Supp. 544 (D.S.C. 1981).
264. Id. at 550. The validity of the wrongful birth claim in Phillips has been chal-
lenged by a motion for summary judgment, and the court did not address the scope of
damages, noting only that "some type of damages would be appropriate ..... Id. at 551.
Recently, the court addressed the issue of liability in Phillips and held that
the failure of the staff at the [Naval Regional Medical Center] to provide ade-,
quate genetic counseling and prenatal testing in light of Mrs. Phillips' positive
family history of Down's syndrome constituted a breach of the applicable stan-
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Robak v. United States, 265 the Seventh Circuit, emphasizing the
impact of Roe, became the first federal appellate court to recog-
nize a cause of action for wrongful birth."6 ' Although the Sev-
enth Circuit's rationale was not unusual, the scope of damages
permitted by the court was unprecedented; the court not only
allowed the extraordinary expenses attributable to the child's
congenital rubella26 7 but also reversed the district court's268 rul-
ing allowing deduction of "the costs of raising a normal child." 2- 9
Finally, California apparently recognizes wrongful birth
claims,270 although the parameters of the damages calculation in
that jurisdiction are unclear.
In summary, a historical review of wrongful birth claims
reveals that "the jurisdictions that have reached the merits of
the controversy are currently unanimous in their recognition of
the cause of actlbn. . . . 'Although the courts have not been in
agreement on how to assess damages, the majority now allow re-
covery of some sort to the parents.' -1271
dard of obstetrical care, precluding an informed prenatal decision to avoid the
birth of a severely afflicted child ....
Phillips v. United States, Nos. 79-551-8, 79-553-8, at 16 (D.S.C. Dec. 7, 1981). Because of
the bifurcated nature of the trial, the issue of damages has not yet been resolved. See id.
at 27-28.
265. 658 F.2d 471 (7th Cir. 1981)(applying Alabama law).
266. Id. at 474-77. "Gleitman and Stewart were based on public policy concerns
that have changed dramatically since the constitutional right to an abortion was recog-
nized in Roe." Id. at 475 n.7. The court also refused to be bound by Elliott v. Brown, 361
So. 2d 546 (Ala. 1978), a case involving wrongful pregnancy and unplanned life claims,
because of its reliance on Gleitman without recognition of the effect of Roe. Id. at 474.
267. Id. at 478.
These costs included past expenses of nearly $30,000; the cost of residential
education and care to age 21, discounted to present value ($229,800); the cost
of a qualified companion, skilled in sign language and experienced in dealing
with emotionally disturbed persons, for the remainder of Jennifer's adult life,
or comparable institutional care ($515,000); and the cost of maintaining her for
her adult life, since she will never be self-supporting ($200,000).
Id. at 478.
268, Robak, 503 F. Supp. 982.
269. 658 F.2d at 478-79. The court relied on a number of wrongful pregnancy cases
for this element of damages. Id. at 479 n.24. No mention was made of the benefits rule.
270. See Curlender, 106 Cal. App. 3d at 817 n.7., 165 Cal. Rptr. at 481 n.7
(1980)(noting pendance of wrongful birth claim). In Turpin v. Sortini, 119 Cal. App. 3d
690, 174 Cal. Rptr. 128 (1981), the intermediate appellate court noted that a parental
cause of action for wrongful birth "is authorized by Stills v. Gratton . . . and is not
challenged on this appeal." Id. at.n.2, 174 Cal. Rptr. at 129 n.2 (citing Stills v. Gratton,
55 Cal. App. 3d 698, 127 Cal. Rptr. 652 (1976)).
271. Phillips II, 508 F. Supp. at 549. These jurisdictions are Alabama, Robak, 658
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C. Theoretical Analysis of the Claim
The unanimity of the jurisdictions that have considered
wrongful birth cases demonstrates that the claim satisfies the
traditional requirements for a negligence action: duty, breach,
proximate cause, and damages. For the sake of completeness,
these elements will be discussed briefly.
1. Duty.-The physician's duty to the parents, particularly
the mother, is not subject to the difficulties presented by the
filial claim;2 72 in wrongful birth claims, the physician's profes-
sional relationship with the mother clearly establishes a duty of
due care.2 3 Although some courts have had problems distin-
guishing between the duties owed to the parents and those owed
to the child,2 74 it is clear that the parents' claims are not derived
from the claim of the child.2 75 The decisions unequivocally rec-
ognize the duty flowing from the physician to his patient.276 Fur-
thermore, in Schroeder v. Perkel,277 an intermediate appellate
court held that the physician owed a duty to the parents even
though his patient was actually their first child, whose geneti-
cally-based disease the physician failed to diagnose before the
parents' conception of a second child.278 Unquestionably, wrong-
ful birth claims contain the necessary element of duty between
the physician and the parents.
2. Breach.-As with wrongful life claims,279 the duty to in-
form parents of the risk of fetal defects depends on the foresee-
ability of those risks. Foreseeability depends on the appearance
of certain risk factors.280 Whether a physican's failure to inform
F.2d 471; California, Turpin, 119 Cal. App. 3d 690, 174 Cal. Rptr. 128; New Jersey, e.g.,
Berman, 80 N.J. 421, 404 A.2d 8; New York, e.g., Becker, 46 N.Y.2d 401, 386 N.E.2d 807,
413 N.Y.S.2d 895; Pennsylvania, Gildiner, 451 F.Supp. 692; South Carolina, Phillips II,
508 F. Supp. 544; Texas, Jacobs, 519 S.W.2d 846; and Wisconsin, Dumer, 69 Wis. 2d 766,
233 N.W.2d 372.
272. See notes 123-137 and accompanying text supra.
273. See, e.g., W. PROSSER, supra note 129, § 32.
274. See, e.g., Howard, 53 A.D.2d 420, 386 N.Y.S.2d 460.
275. Gildiner, 451 F. Supp. at 695.
276. E.g., Becker, 46 N.Y.2d at 412, 386 N.E.2d at 813, 413 N.Y.S.2d at 901; Jacobs,
519 S.W.2d at 848; Dumer, 69 Wis. 2d at 776, 233 N.W.2d at 377.
277. 87 N.J. 53, 432 A.2d 834 (1981).
278. Id. at -, 432 A.2d at 838-39. "A physician's duty... may extend beyond the
interests of a patient to members of the immediate family of the patient who may be
adversely affected by a breach of that duty." Id.
279. See notes 138-159 and accompanying text supra.
280. See notes 139-146 and accompanying text supra.
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parents of risks breached his duty of care must be determined
by expert testimony. 2s Although the proof of the physician's
breach is an issue of fact, questions concerning the existence of
breach do not present a legal or theoretical bar to the recogni-
tion of wrongful birth claims.
3. Proximate Cause.-Assuming that the parents allege and
show that, but for the physician's negligence, they would have
terminated the pregnancy or avoided conception, the element of
proximate cause does not present a legal obstacle to wrongful
birth claims.282 Although earlier cases apparently required the
parents to show that an abortion was legally obtainable at the
time that it could have been performed,283 more recent cases
hold that this argument is specious if an abortion could have
been obtained in another state.2" Attempts by defendants in
wrongful pregnancy cases to construe the parent's act of sexual
intercourse as an intervening cause that supersedes the physi-
cian's negligence may be applicable to wrongful birth claims
based on preconception negligence, but the defense has not been
successful in the wrongful pregnancy context286 and is no more
persuasive in the wrongful birth context. Thus, the parents' as-
sertion that they would have avoided the defective child's birth
if they had been properly informed is sufficient to establish the
"causal connection between defendant's failure to inform and
plaintiffs' damages. "287
4. Damages.-As indicated by the historical review of
wrongful birth claims, "the question of damages has presented a
281. Phillips II, 508 F. Supp. at 551. See Phillips v. United States, Nos. 79-551-8,
79-553-8, at 8-16 (D.S.C. Dec. 7, 1981)(liability order).
282. E.g., Robak, 658 F.2d at 477; Gildiner, 451 F. Supp. at 695; Jacobs, 519 S.W.2d
at 848. See notes 150 & 151 and accompanying text supra.
283. Jacobs, 519 S.W.2d at 848. See Dumer, 69 Wis. 2d at 775 n.6, 233 N.W.2d at
377 n.6.
284. Robak, 658 F.2d at 476-77. Moreover, if a state's abortion statute has been de-
clared unconstitutional after the tort has been committed but before the action has been
commenced, a court may refuse to give the unconstitutional law continuing effect. Id. at
475. See Phillips II, 508 F. Supp. at 550 (suggesting that constitutional protection of
eugenic abortions preceded Roe).
285. See Bishop v. Byrne, 205 F. Supp. 460 (S.D.W. Va. 1967); Custodio v. Bauer,
251 Cal. App. 2d 303, 59 Cal. Rptr. 463 (1967).
286. 265 F. Supp. at 464; 251 Cal. App. 2d at 316, 59 Cal. Rptr. at 472.
287. Jacobs, 519 S.W.2d at 848. Presumably, an admission by the plaintiffs, either
in discovery or at trial, that they would not have obtained an abortion under any circum-
stance would bar a wrongful birth claim based on postconception negligence.
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difficult and troublesome problem to the courts that have con-
sidered 'wrongful birth' claims, with that difficulty engendering
widely divergent approaches . . ,, ."s' Courts generally allow the
extraordinary expenses relating to the child's defect that must
be borne by the parents,289 and some courts have compensated
for the parents' pain and suffering or mental anguish.9 0 One
court has allowed all expenses incident to the care of the child,
without discounting those expenses not directly related to the
child's defect that would be necessary for a normal child. 91
Much of the confusion apparent in the area of damages has
been created by the benefits rule. Admittedly, the physician's
negligence may result in both benefits and detriments to the
parents;292 despite the affliction of the child, the "parents may
yet experience a love that even an abnormality cannot fully
dampen. '29 3 This argument has been used to deny, as a matter
of law, recovery for both pecuniary loss 2 4 and emotional
anguish.295 The principle underlying the benefits rule29 6 should
not, however, operate as a complete bar to any element of the
parents' damages. Although the benefits rule was originally pro-
pounded as a theoretical barrier to the recognition of wrongful
pregnancy claims involving healthy children 97 its application
even in that context has gradually been restricted: it would be
"myopic to declare today that the benefits [of parenthood] ex-
ceed the costs as a matter of law. 29 8 Moreover, the benefits de-
rived by the parent in a wrongful birth case are generally distin-
guishable from the benefits in a wrongful pregnancy case
288. Phillips II, 508 F. Supp. at 551. See generally Comment, Wrongful Birth Dam-
ages, supra note 193.
289. E.g., Jacobs, 519 S.W.2d at 849; Dumer, 69 Wis. 2d at 776, 233 N.W.2d at 377.
290. Schroeder, 87 N.J. 53, 432 A.2d 834. Other courts have expressly disallowed
emotional damages. E.g., Becker, 46 N.Y.2d at 413, 386 N.E.2d at 813, 413 N.Y.S.2d at
901 (citing Howard, 42 N.Y.2d 109, 366 N.E.2d 64, 397 N.Y.S.2d 363), while other courts
have not addressed the issue. See Dumer, 69 Wis. 2d at 776, 233 N.W.2d at 377.
291. Robak, 658 F.2d at 478.
292. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 920 (1977).
293. Becker, 46 N.Y.2d at 414-15, 386 N.E.2d at 814, 413 N.Y.S.2d at 912. See
Berman, 80 N.J. at 432, 404 A.2d at 14.
294. Berman, 80 N.J. at 432, 404 A.2d at 14.
295. Becker, 46 N.Y.2d at 414-15, 386 N.E.2d at 814, 413 N.Y.S.2d at 902.
296. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 920 (1977).
297. See note 211 and accompanying text supra.
298. Sherlock v. Stillwater Clinic, 260 N.W.2d 169, 175 (Minn. 1977)(wrongful preg-
nancy claim involving healthy child).
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because the benefits in a wrongful birth claim depend on the
extent of the child's affliction. 299 Thus, although the benefits rule
is a legitimate element of the calculation of damages, it should
not restrict the scope of permissible damages. "In calculating
plaintiff's damages, any benefits they derive from defendant's
negligence may properly be offset against the detriments which
flow from that conduct, in accordance with traditional tort prin-
ciples."300 Because the benefits at issue are essentially emotional
in nature, the principle would seem to apply primarily to the
parents' mental suffering and emotional damages. In any case,
"[b]ecause at least some damages are cognizable at law,... [a]
motion for judgment on the pleadings [in a wrongful birth
claim] may not be granted for lack of damages."301
IV. POLICY CONSIDERATIONS
Despite the conformity of wrongful life and wrongful birth
claims to the conventional tort framework, these claims have re-
ceived markedly different treatment in the courts, apparently
based on divergent policy considerations.0 2 Thus, a thorough ex-
amination of these causes of action necessitates a comparison of
the policy considerations underlying each of the claims.
Recent wrongful life decisions are candid in their recogni-
tion that "[t]he most potent arguments ... against 'wrongful
life' claims are predicated on public policy considerations." 303
Furthermore,
[a]lthough these arguments are phrased in varying terminol-
ogy-the "impossibility" of determining damages based on a
comparison of defective existence with nonexistence, . . . the
absence of recognized damages,... the metaphysical, theologi-
cal, or philosophical nature of the issues,.., the lack of a "jus-
ticiable" issue, . . . or the absence of a legally "cognizable"
cause of action . . . - they essentially focus on the "precious-
299. Becker, 46 N.Y.2d at 414-15, 386 N.E.2d at 814, 413 N.Y.S.2d at 912.
300. Phillips II, 508 F. Supp. at 555. "The complexity of this balancing process is
not, however, directly relevant to the validity of the cause of action . . . " Id. (citing
Story Parchment Co. v. Paterson Co., 282 U.S. 555 (1931)).
301. Gildiner, 451 F. Supp. at 696.
302. Compare Phillips I, 508 F. Supp. at 543 (policy considerations militate against
recognition of wrongful life claims) with Phillips II, 508 F. Supp. at 551 (policy consider-
ations support recognition of wrongful birth claims).
303. Phillips 1, 508 F. Supp. at 543.
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ness of human life. 30' 4
Although the policy considerations applied to wrongful life
claims have remained relatively unchanged,30 5 the policy consid-
erations applied to wrongful birth claims have undergone a star-
tling transformation. Rather than focusing on the sanctity of
human life, the courts have begun to emphasize societal con-
cerns in ensuring accurate prenatal testing08 and deterring pro-
fessional negligence."0 7 In light of Roe v. Wade, some courts have
suggested that failure to recognize wrongful birth or wrongful
pregnancy claims could "impermissibly burden the constitu-
tional rights involved in conception, procreation, and other fa-
milial decisions."30 8 Although a few courts have advanced similar
arguments in wrongful life cases,30 9 the overwhelming majority
of jurisdictions maintain this curiously dichotomous approach to
the policy considerations underlying what ostensibly are closely
related claims. The inconsistency in this approach is apparent: if
the child's assertion that nonexistence would be preferable to his
defective existence is rendered uncognizable by the sanctity of
life principle, why must the parents' claim be treated differ-
ently? Both claims are premised on the allegation that the phy-
sician's negligence precluded an informed parental decision to
avoid the child's birth and thus injured the parents and the
304. Id. (citations omitted). The court also described certain other policy arguments
raised by the cases, such as the opportunity for fraudulent claims, the possibility of a
substantial increase in litigation, and the "perceived preemption of legislative preroga-
tive in recognizing... new cause[s] of action," as "merely cumulative to the more funda-
mental policy. . . -the preciousness and sanctity of human life." Id.
305. Although the antiabortion component of the policy argument in Gleitman has
assertedly been abandoned, e.g., Berman v. Allan, 80 N.J. at 431, 404 A.2d at 14, the
component of the policy argument focusing on "the preciousness and sanctity of human
life," Phillips I, 508 F. Supp. at 543, remains essentially unchanged from 1967 to the
present. Compare id. with Gleitman, 49 N.J. at 31, 227 A.2d at 693.
306. Gildiner, 451 F. Supp. at 696.
307. Id. See Berman, 80 N.J. at 432, 404 A.2d at 14.
308. Phillips II, 508 F. Supp. at 550. E.g., Sherlock v. Stillwater Clinic, 260 N.W.2d
169 (Minn. 1977); Bowman v. Davis, 48 Ohio St. 2d 41, 356 N.E.2d 496 (1976). See, e.g.,
Troppi, 31 Mich. App. at 253, 187 N.W.2d at 517.
309. Curlender, 106 Cal. App. 3d at 821, 165 Cal. Rptr. at 483 (noting "that consid-
erations of public policy should include regard for social welfare as affected by careful
genetic counseling and medical procedures," id. at 827, 165 Cal. Rptr. at 486-87, and
"that there should be a remedy for every wrong committed, id. at 831, 165 Cal. Rptr. at
489"); Park, 60 A.D.2d at 88, 400 N.Y.S.2d at 114 (noting that Roe creates "a public
policy consideration which gives potential parents the right, within certain statutory and
case law limitations, not to have a child").
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child; both claims assume that, under some circumstances, the
burdens imposed by defective existence outweigh its benefits,
whether to the parents or the child.
One possible explanation for this inconsistency is residual
opposition to abortion, despite the Supreme Court's opinion in
Roe. The antiabortion policy espoused so vigorously in earlier
cases, 310 particularly in light of the current fervor of antiabortion
sentiment,311 suggests that a policy opposing abortion-whether
theological, philosophical, or moral in nature-may constitute an
important, though tacit, element in the consideration of wrong-
ful life claims. In the context of wrongful birth claims, this pol-
icy is displaced by certain well-established parental rights con-
cerning conception and procreation;3 12 in the context of wrongful
life claims, however, the child, whose constitutional rights are
severely curtailed during fetal development, does not himself
possess any established right, constitutional or otherwise, that
counterbalances or overcomes the extrinsic antiabortion policy
that is perceived as militating against wrongful life claims. That
is to say, the parents can assert a constitutional right to abort
the fetus or to avoid conception, but the child does not have an
analogous right not to be born. 313
This conclusion draws inferential support from judicial ac-
tion in certain other areas. In DES cases, 14 the plaintiffs are, at
least to some extent, asserting that nonexistence would be pref-
erable to life burdened by the drug-induced carcinoma, since the
310. E.g., Gleitman, 49 N.J. at 30-31, 227 A.2d at 693; Stewart, 35 A.D.2d at 532,
313 N.Y.S.2d at 503; Note, 4 HAMLINE L. REv. 59, 106 (1980).
311. Parness, Social Commentary: Values and Legal Personhood, 83 W. VA. L. Rpv.
487, 488 (1981). See, e.g., H.R. REP. No. 294, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979); H.R. REP. No.
51, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979); S. REP. No. 22, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979) (proposed
federal legislation purporting to endow fetuses with constitutional personhood under the
Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution); Destro, Abortion
and the Constitution: The Need for a Life-Protective Amendment, 63 CALIF. L. REv.
1250 (1975); Lynch, The National Committee for a Human Life Amendment, Inc.: Its
Goals and Origins, 20 CATH. LAW. 303 (1974); Note, Abortion Conscience Clauses, 11
COLUM. J.L. & Soc. PROB. 571 (1975).
312. Under Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973), and Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179
(1973), the constitutional right of privacy that protects the decision to abort a fetus in-
ures to the mother; under Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965), the constitu-
tional right of privacy that protects familial decisions concerning conception and procre-
ation is held by both parents.
313. Gleitman, 49 N.J. at 63, 227 A.2d at 711.
314. See notes 171-173 and accompanying text supra.
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drug was prescribed in high-risk pregnancies "to prevent possi-
ble miscarriages.1 1 5 However, the courts have raised no objec-
tions to damages in DES cases, arguably because of a perceived
distinction between "artificial" eugenic abortions, which trigger
the misplaced fear of "a 'Fascist-Orwellian societal attitude of
genetic purity,' "311 and "natural" spontaneous abortions or mis-
carriages. Similarly, in those cases in which the physician's neg-
ligence actually causes the congenital defect rather than merely
precluding the opportunity to avoid the child's birth, 17 the
child's assertion that he would have been better off never having
been born is not viewed with suspicion.318 At least in the context
of conventional prenatal torts, a child apparently does have a
"right to begin life with a sound mind and body. ''sL9
Despite this subtle and inconstant distinction between
wrongful life claims and other prenatal torts, certain "scientific
and technological advances . . . may eventually provide a new
perspective from which to analyze"320 the policy considerations
barring wrongful life claims.
For example, one could hypothesize a technological break-
through in genetic engineering, focusing perhaps on the trans-
duction or transformation of chromosomal material through re-
combinant DNA ("gene-splicing") techniques, controlled
mutagenesis, or microsurgery, or in euphrenics, which would
allow a particular genetic defect to be treated in utero during
the early stages of pregnancy. Thus, "but for" the physician's
negligence in failing to detect and treat the abnormality, the
315. See Ryan v. Eli Lilly & Co., 514 F. Supp. 1004, 1006 (D.S.C. 1981). For a re-
sponse to this argument, see Abrahams & Musgrave, supra note 171, at 702.
316. Gildiner, 451 F. Supp. at 695.
317. E.g., Scales, No. A-79-CA-70. See note 143 and accompanying text supra.
318. In Scales, the plaintiff asserted that the physicians' negligence in vaccinating
his mother for rubella while she was pregnant produced the congenital rubella with
which he was afflicted, id. at 2; the plaintiff also asserted that the physicians' negligence
in failing to inform his mother of the fetal risks associated with maternal rubella infec-
tions prevented a decision to abort the fetal plaintiff, id. at 2-3. The court found both of
these assertions to be true, id. at 5-6, and awarded the plaintiff $625,000 without specifi-
cally allocating the award between the prenatal tort and wrongful life claims. Id. at 7.
The court did not dismiss the wrongful life claim from the complaint and apparently
predicated recovery, at least to some extent, on the conclusion that "the Government's
negligence ... was a proximate cause of... [the plaintiff's] mother not terminating her
pregnancy and of ... [the plaintiff] being born with congenital rubella syndrome." Id.
319. Smith v. Brennan, 31 N.J. 353, 364, 157 A.2d 497, 503 (1960).
320. Phillips I, 508 F. Supp. at 543.
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plaintiff could have lived a normal life. Under these hypotheti-
cal circumstances, a claim that is currently viewed as one for
"wrongful life" involving the comparison of a defective exis-
tence to nonexistence begins to exhibit marked similarities to a
concededly cognizable cause of action-a tort en ventre sa
mere.
3 21
This hypothetical demonstrates once again the crucial impact of
antiabortion policy: if medical malpractice in genetic counseling
or prenatal testing results in the failure to diagnose a congenital
defect that could be treated in utero, the infant plaintiff clearly
has a prenatal tort claim; conversely, if medical malpractice in
genetic counseling or prenatal testing results in the failure to di-
agnose a congenital defect that can be "treated" only by eugenic
abortion, the infant plaintiff's claim for wrongful life is un-
cognizable. Thus, the primary and perhaps only distinction be-
tween wrongful life claims and other prenatal torts is the un-
availability of in utero treatment in the circumstances of the
former; the only alternatives are defective birth or eugenic
abortion.
V. CONCLUSION
Both wrongful life and wrongful birth claims, which exhibit
the requisite elements of duty, breach, proximate cause, and
damages, fall within the traditional tort framework. The marked
divergence in judicial reaction to these claims is attributable to
policy considerations focusing on "the preciousness and sanctity
of human life. '3 2 2 This policy is displaced by the parents' consti-
tutional rights concerning conception and procreation, but the
child does not presently possess a countervailing right that sup-
plants the policy disfavoring abortion.
The preeminence of policy considerations is inherent in the
very definition of wrongful life claims, which are distinguished
from conventional prenatal torts by the unavailability of in
utero treatment that would be less drastic than eugenic abor-
tion. The impasse between these policy considerations and the
traditional tort principle that liability should follow the wrong-
321. Id. at 543 n.12 (citations omitted).
322. Id. at 543.
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doer 323 could be alleviated in three ways. First, to the extent
that the scientific and technological advances postulated in Phil-
lips2" actually occur, currently untreatable congenital defects
may become susceptible of in utero treatment; these advances
would transform wrongful life claims into conventional prenatal
tort claims. Second, the "cultural lag" between prenatal testing
technology, particularly amniocentesis, and morality may resolve
itself "as beliefs and social mores 'catch up' to technological ad-
vances." 32 5 Under this view, societal recognition of "the high de-
gree of accuracy and predictability" 326 in prenatal testing will
eventually result in a readjustment of popular morality32 7 that
presumably would minimize policy objections based on antiabor-
tion considerations. Finally, the judiciary's traditional authority
to delineate the scope of common-law negligence could be em-
ployed to endow fetuses with a limited right not to be born by
drawing on a child's "right to begin life with a sound mind and
body" 28  and, derivatively, on the parents' procreational
rights. 2 ' This limited right could then displace antiabortion pol-
icy considerations in wrongful life cases in appropriate circum-
stances, as does the parents' constitutionally protected right of
privacy in the wrongful birth context. Because the physician's
negligence may confer benefits as well as burdens, damages in
both wrongful life and wrongful birth claims should be mitigated
"in accordance with traditional tort principles."330 As with
wrongful birth claims, recognition of wrongful life claims would
promote societal interests in genetic counseling and prenatal
testing, 31 deter medical malpractice,3 2 and at least partially re-
dress a clear and undeniable wrong.
323. Fitzer v. Greater Greenville S.C. YMCA, - S.C
(1981).
324. Phillips I, 508 F. Supp. at 543 n.12.
325. Peters & Peters, supra note 11, at 876.
326. Id.
327. Id.
328. Smith v. Brennan, 31 N.J. at 364, 157 A.2d at 5
329. E.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973); Griswold
(1965).
330. Phillips II, 508 F. Supp. at 550 (citing RESTATEM
(1977)).
331. Gildiner, 451 F. Supp. at 695-96.
332. Id. See Berman, 80 N.J. at 432, 404 A.2d at 14.
. -, -, 282 S.E.2d 230, 231
03.
v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479
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